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Introduction 
 
As the immigration debate rages in the United States, a growing number of 
state and local governments have enacted laws sanctioning employers who  
employ undocumented immigrant workers and requiring employers to use an 
electronic employee-verification system (referred to collectively as “subfederal 
employer-sanctions laws”).1 Over the past few years, there has been a tug-of-war 
about whether state and local governments may enact employer-sanctions laws2 
without running afoul of the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.3 One federal 
 
1. State legislatures passed twenty-one employment-related immigration laws in 
2009 and twenty-seven employment-related immigration laws in 2010. 2010 Immi-
gration-Related Laws and Resolutions in the States (January 1-December 31, 2010), 
Nat’l Conf. St. Legislatures (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx 
?tabid=21857. While the focus here is on subfederal employer-sanctions laws, it is 
important to note that these laws are often one aspect of broader subfederal legis-
lative initiatives that also “contain a combination of provisions: they make English 
the ‘official language’ of the municipality, eliminate gathering places for day  
laborers, . . . restrict unauthorized immigrants’ access to public benefits, and pre-
vent unauthorized immigrants from renting housing.” Rigel C. Oliveri, Between a 
Rock and a Hard Place: Landlords, Latinos, Anti-Illegal Immigrant Ordinances, and 
Housing Discrimination, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 55, 57 (2009). Nonetheless, “[v]irtually 
every state and local . . . ordinance features employment restrictions as its center-
piece.” Id. at 111. 
2. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, It’s the Economy, Stupid: The Hijacking of the Debate 
over Immigration Reform by Monsters, Ghosts, and Goblins (or the War on Drugs, 
War on Terror, Narcoterrorists, Etc.), 13 Chap. L. Rev. 583, 605 (2010) (“Over the 
last few years, there has been much ferment over the role of state and local gov-
ernments in immigration and immigrant law.”). 
3. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. There are often other legal theories simultaneously  
advanced in these cases. For a case involving a Supremacy Clause argument as 
well as a due process argument, see Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 544 
F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008), amended and superseded on denial of reh’g by 558 F.3d 856 
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district court and three federal courts of appeals have considered the issue and 
have come to contrary conclusions.4 The U.S. Supreme Court is considering the 
constitutionality of Arizona’s employer-sanctions law during its 2010-2011 
Term.5 This Article addresses the unresolved Supremacy Clause question about 
the constitutionality of subfederal employer-sanctions laws from an entirely 
new vantage point. 
Thus far, court battles and scholarship about this Supremacy Clause issue 
have turned on how to interpret the preemptive force of a federal immigration 
law: the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).6 IRCA sanctions 
employers who knowingly hire or employ undocumented workers,7 and  
requires employers to use either the I-9 employee-verification procedure or an 
electronic employee-verification system (“E-Verify”).8 It also forbids employees 
from knowingly using fraudulent documents to gain employment.9 Because the 
U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause requires subfederal laws to yield to feder-
al law in circumstances when the two are in conflict,10 there is a legitimate ques-
tion as to whether a federal employer-sanctions law (IRCA) preempts subfeder-
 
(9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. 
Candelaria, 130 S. Ct. 3498 (2010). 
4. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding the local law to be 
preempted by federal immigration law); Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. 
Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding preemption); Chicanos Por La 
Causa, 558 F.3d 856 (finding no preemption); Gray v. City of Valley Park, No. 
4:07CV00881 ERW, 2008 WL 294294 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008) (finding no preemp-
tion). 
5. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d 856, cert. granted sub nom. Chamber of Com-
merce of the U.S. v. Candelaria, 130 S. Ct. 3498 (2010). 
6. Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 
Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
7. The potential sanctions for violations are monetary civil sanctions or, in more  
serious cases, criminal sanctions. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f) (2006). 
8. Id. § 1324a(a)-(b); see What is E-Verify?, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Services, 
http://www.uscis.gov (follow “E-Verify Homepage” to “What is E-Verify?”) (last 
visited Mar. 22, 2011) (stating that “E-Verify is an Internet-based system that 
compares information from an employee’s Form I-9, Employment Eligibility  
Verification, to data from U.S [sic] Department of Homeland Security and Social 
Security Administration records to confirm employment eligibility”). 
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a). 
10. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law 
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
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al employer-sanctions laws. A singular focus on federal immigration law, how-
ever, has resulted in a split of authority in the courts to date.11 
In contrast to the extensive scholarly and judicial focus on whether federal 
immigration law (IRCA, in particular) preempts subfederal employer-sanctions 
laws, this Article moves the analytical focus toward federal employment law. 
This Article specifically considers the preemptive force of two baseline federal 
employment laws: the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA)12 and Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).13 FLSA, which prohibits child labor 
and establishes federal minimum-wage and overtime requirements, and Title 
VII, which protects employees from employment discrimination based on their 
membership in certain protected classes, provide some of the most broad-
reaching workplace protections for employees in the United States. 
The potential intersections and conflicts between federal workplace protec-
tions for employees and subfederal employer-sanctions laws call for new  
Supremacy Clause frameworks (also referred to as “preemption frameworks”) 
that incorporate federal employment laws.14 Subfederal employer-sanctions 
laws, like federal employment laws, aim to achieve their goals through heigh-
tened regulation of the workplace. These subfederal laws, therefore, may impli-
cate federal employment law along with federal immigration law. Moreover, 
broadly speaking, there is a potential conflict between FLSA’s and Title VII’s  
inclusiveness of a broad class of workers, including undocumented workers, 
and the exclusiveness of subfederal laws prohibiting the employment of undo-
cumented workers entirely.15 The underlying logic of the two federal employ-
ment laws at issue here is that protecting the labor pool’s most marginalized  
employees from workplace abuses will improve the working standards of all 
employees. FLSA and Title VII include a wide range of employees in their 
workplace protections in order to deter employers from preferring, or taking 
 
11. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
12. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060, 1060 (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2006)). 
13. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
14. For an article detailing the tensions and increasing interconnectivity between  
immigration regulation and workplace regulation in the United States, see Kati L. 
Griffith, U.S. Migrant Worker Law: The Interstices of Immigration Law and Labor 
and Employment Law, 31 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 125 (2009). 
15. Cf. Kathleen Kim, The Trafficked Worker as Private Attorney General: A Model for 
Enforcing the Civil Rights of Undocumented Workers, 2009 U. Chi. Legal F. 247, 
248 (stating that there is an “inherent tension between the restrictive goals of im-
migration laws, used to control the nation’s borders, and the expansive civil rights 
laws, utilized within U.S. borders to remove discriminatory restrictions on the  
labor pool”). 
Article - Griffith - 18 - Final - 2011.05.25 6/17/2011  3:14 PM 
DISCOVERING “IMMPLOYMENT” LAW  
 393 
advantage of, marginalized workers.16 In contrast, subfederal employer-
sanctions laws unequivocally aim to exclude undocumented workers from the 
United States.17  
This Article develops two general preemption frameworks that feature fed-
eral employment law. It first devises and applies an implied-preemption analy-
sis of subfederal employer-sanctions laws based on the preemptive force of 
FLSA and Title VII. In doing so, this Article reveals that the four subfederal  
employer-sanctions laws that have produced conflicting court decisions are  
unconstitutional because they stand as obstacles to fundamental policies under-
lying FLSA and Title VII. Specifically, these four subfederal laws, along with 
other subfederal laws that share their qualities, conflict with core federal  
employment policy goals of protecting employees from employment discrimi-
nation and encouraging valid employee-initiated complaints from marginalized 
workers for the benefit of employees more broadly. Second, this Article devel-
ops a hybrid preemption framework that simultaneously considers the policy 
goals of federal immigration law and federal employment law. This new hybrid 
framework highlights an additional theory for preemption of these subfederal 
employer-sanctions laws. This Article’s analytical focus on legal theories for 
preemption of subfederal employer-sanctions also indirectly exposes a number 
of policy tensions between workplace-based immigration regulation and federal 
workplace protections more generally.  
Part I of this Article briefly sets forth the history of subfederal employer-
sanctions laws in the United States and the Supremacy Clause challenges they 
have faced thus far in the courts. It describes preemption analyses of subfederal 
 
16. For FLSA legislative history confirming this claim, see 93 Cong. Rec. 1495 (1947) 
(“Remember, also, that the public, in addition to the employee, is interested in the 
matter of [FLSA] liquidated damages.”); 82 Cong. Rec. 1390-92 (1937) (arguing 
that FLSA would ensure that all workers had living wages and hours); and 81 
Cong. Rec. 7672 (1937) (stating that “the poorest-wage workers, who are not  
organized, who have no means of asserting their rights to a living wage, are now 
to have the benefit of a Federal commission to hear their claim to a living wage”). 
For Title VII legislative history confirming this claim, see H.R. Rep. No. 102-40, 
pt. 1, at 64-65 (1991) (describing Title VII’s monetary damages as “necessary to 
make discrimination victims whole for the terrible injury to their careers, to their 
mental and emotional health, and to their self-respect and dignity”); and 188 
Cong. Rec. 7168 (1972) (stating that Title VII “involve[s] the vindication of a  
major public interest, and that any action under the Act involves considerations 
beyond those raised by the individual claimant”). See also Catherine Fisk & Mi-
chael Wishnie, The Story of Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Labor 
Rights Without Remedies for Undocumented Immigrants, in Labor Law Stories 
399, 399-400 (Laura J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds., 2005) (noting the connec-
tion between the rights of individuals and the rights of employees more broadly). 
17. See, e.g., Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, § 2(D) (Sept. 8, 2006) (stating that the 
City of Hazleton is “mandated by the people of Hazleton to abate the nuisance of 
illegal immigration by diligently prohibiting the acts and policies that facilitate  
illegal immigration”). 
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employer-sanctions laws to date, which have focused exclusively on federal 
immigration law and have resulted in conflicting court decisions. In Part II, this 
Article demonstrates why it is crucial to develop Supremacy Clause analyses of 
subfederal employer-sanctions laws that consider federal employment law in 
particular. It illuminates the ways that subfederal employer-sanctions laws  
simultaneously implicate two historically separate statutory regimes and there-
fore should be considered hybrids between immigration law and employment 
law (what this Article refers to as “immployment law”).  
Part III develops an implied-preemption analysis based on two federal  
employment laws, FLSA and Title VII. It shows that subfederal employer-
sanctions laws, as currently written, are unconstitutional because of the ways in 
which they conflict with FLSA and Title VII. It thereby proposes a theory for 
preemption that could help resolve the unsettled issue of federal law’s preemp-
tive effects on subfederal employer-sanctions laws. It focuses on the laws of two 
states (Arizona and Oklahoma) and two localities (Hazleton, Pennsylvania, and 
Valley Park, Missouri) because courts are currently in disagreement about the 
preemptive force of federal immigration law in these contexts. These four laws 
are also instructive because, while there is wide variation in the content of sub-
federal employer-sanctions laws across the country,18 many of the dominant 
prohibitions, requirements, enforcement schemes, and consequences for viola-
tions are present in at least one or all four of these subfederal laws.19 In Part IV, 
this Article develops a hybrid immployment-law preemption framework that 
considers both federal immigration-law and federal employment-law policy 
goals. Part V proposes arguments for why, even if the subfederal laws were 
amended to mirror the federal government’s employer-sanctions regime in its 
entirety, federal law would preempt these four subfederal employer-sanctions 
laws. 
 
I. Subfederal Employer-Sanctions Laws and Federal Immigration 
Law’s Preemptive Effects  
 
Thus far, Supremacy Clause challenges to subfederal employer-sanctions 
laws have focused exclusively on federal immigration law’s preemptive effects. 
These challenges began soon after individual states enacted the first employer-
 
18. For descriptions of some of this variation, see Cristina Rodriguez, Mazaffar 
Chishti & Kimberly Nortman, Migration Policy Inst., Testing the Limits: 
A Framework for Assessing the Legality of State and Local Immigration 
Measures (2007), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/NCIIP 
_Assessing%20the%20Legality%20of%20State%20and%20Local%20Immigration%2
0Measures121307.pdf. 
19. The analysis in the remainder of this Article applies to the laws of: (1) Hazleton, 
Pennsylvania; (2) Valley Park, Missouri; (3) Arizona; (4) Oklahoma; as well as 
laws in other parts of the country that mirror these four laws’ provisions. Where 
relevant, this Article will cite other laws that have provisions similar to those of 
the Hazleton, Valley Park, Arizona, or Oklahoma laws. 
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sanctions laws. In the 1970s, more than a decade before the federal government 
enacted an employer-sanctions law, approximately twelve state and local  
authorities passed some form of employer-sanctions law.20 In the 1976 case De 
Canas v. Bica,21 the U.S. Supreme Court heard a constitutional challenge to 
California’s 1971 employer-sanctions law. California’s law prohibited California 
employers from knowingly employing workers who were “not entitled to lawful 
residence in the United States if such employment would have an adverse effect 
on lawful resident workers.”22 In De Canas, lawful residents sued their employer 
and invoked California’s employer-sanctions law. The employee-plaintiffs  
argued that they were out of work because of the employer’s “knowing em-
ployment” of undocumented workers.23 The lower courts dismissed the plain-
tiffs’ complaint, concluding that California’s employer-sanctions law conflicted 
with federal immigration law and was therefore unconstitutional under the Su-
premacy Clause.24  
The Supreme Court, in its decision in De Canas, disagreed with the em-
ployer and lower courts’ view of federal immigration law’s preemptive force.25 It 
held that California’s employer-sanctions law was constitutional as it did not 
conflict with federal authority over immigration. Since federal immigration law 
at the time did not include any express language about preemption of subfeder-
al employer-sanctions laws, the De Canas Court considered federal immigration 
law in its entirety and searched for ways to infer Congress’s intent with respect 
to preemption.26  
There are three main types of preemption analysis. Express-preemption 
analyses consider the plain language of the statute to determine Congress’s  
intent.27 Implied-preemption analyses require preemption of subfederal laws 
when the federal government has occupied “the field” such that there is no 
room for subfederal laws.28 Another form of implied preemption trumps subfe-
deral laws when “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physi-
cal impossibility, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”29  
 
20. See Huyen Pham, The Private Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 96 Geo. L.J. 777, 
787 (2008) (noting that, after California enacted its employer-sanctions law in 
1971, “[t]en states and one city soon followed suit, passing similar legislation”). 
21. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).  
22. Id. at 352 (quoting Cal. Lab. Code § 2805). 
23. Id. at 353. 
24. Id. at 353-54. 
25. Id. at 365. 
26. Id. at 356-65. 
27. See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992). 
28. Id. 
29. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The De Canas Court primarily conducted a field-preemption analysis and 
concluded that federal immigration law did not impliedly preempt California’s 
law because it was not a “regulation of immigration.”30 Regulations of immigra-
tion, the Court went on to state, are “determination[s] of who should or should 
not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal  
entrant may remain.”31 California’s law, which focused on employment rather 
than government decisions related to the admission of, and conditions for, legal 
entrants, did not fit this definition of the federally dominated field. In other 
words, the Court viewed the employment of immigrants as a “peripheral  
concern” of national immigration policy as it stood in 1976.32 When the  
Supreme Court decided De Canas, the federal government did not regulate 
immigration via the workplace.33 Moreover, the De Canas Court emphasized 
that California was not overreaching because it was acting appropriately  
pursuant to its police powers.34 California’s purpose was “to strengthen its 
economy” and to protect California residents.35 Undocumented immigrants, 
according to the Court, “seriously depress wage scales and working conditions 
of citizens and legally admitted aliens,”36 and the law was narrowly tailored to 
address this local concern.37 
For thirty years following the 1976 De Canas decision, preemption chal-
lenges involving subfederal employer-sanctions laws were rare. This was the 
case even after the federal government arguably altered the definition of “regu-
lation of immigration” through the enactment of its own employer-sanctions 
law in 1986, the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA).38 As noted 
above,39 IRCA restricts employers from knowingly recruiting, hiring, or em-
 
30. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 360. 
33. This is in contrast to many European countries that enacted employer-sanctions 
laws in the 1970s. See Philip Martin & Mark Miller, Employer Sanctions: French, 
German and US Experiences 3-4 (Int’l Labour Office, Working Paper No. 36, 
2000), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/migrant/ 
download/imp/imp36.pdf. 
34. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 356. 
35. Id. at 355, 356. 
36. Id. at 357. 
37. The law, according to the Court, “focuses directly upon these essentially local 
problems and is tailored to combat effectively the perceived evils.” Id. at 357. 
38. See Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over 
Immigration, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1557, 1565 (2008) (discussing federal immigration 
law’s entrance into areas that were traditionally in the “triumvirate of state power: 
criminal law, employment law, and welfare”). 
39. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text. 
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ploying undocumented employees.40 It imposes civil and, in more serious cases, 
criminal sanctions on employers who violate this provision.41 To comply with 
IRCA’s requirement that employers verify their employees’ work authorization, 
an employer can either fill out the paper I-9 form and keep a copy on file or 
utilize the federal government’s online E-Verify system, which pulls data from 
the Social Security Administration and the Department of Homeland  
Security.42  
Preemption challenges to subfederal employer-sanctions laws were rare  
before 2006, at least in part because state and local governments largely did not 
legislate in this area. This is not all that surprising because IRCA contains a 
preemption provision which, in many ways, forecloses subfederal governments 
from regulating the employment of immigrants.43 It states that IRCA 
“preempt[s] any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other 
than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or 
refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.”44 The language of this 
provision makes it clear that Congress intended to foreclose state and local  
governments from imposing “civil or criminal sanctions” on employers who 
employ undocumented employees.45 In other words, IRCA’s plain language  
expressly preempts subfederal laws (such as California’s 1971 law described 
above) that impose these kinds of sanctions. What is less immediately clear is 
what Congress intended with respect to the phrase “licensing and similar laws.” 
These four words are important, of course, because they form IRCA’s savings 
clause.46 State and local laws that fall within the scope of this phrase are “saved” 
from IRCA preemption. 
Since 2006, state and local governments have passed dozens of employer-
sanctions laws, which, they contend, fall within IRCA’s savings clause or are not 
 
40. Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 § 101(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a) 
(2006). 
41. Id. § 1324a(f). It also prohibits employees from knowingly using fraudulent doc-
uments to obtain a job. Id. § 1324c(a). 
42. Id. § 1324a(a)-(b). 
43. See Pham, supra note 20, at 789 (noting that IRCA’s preemption provision 
preempted many pre-IRCA subfederal employer-sanctions laws). 
44. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2). 
45. Some states, however, still have employer-sanctions laws that impose civil or 
criminal sanctions on their books. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-2-122(4) 
(West Supp. 2010) (imposing civil sanctions); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 448.09(2), (3) 
(West Supp. 2010) (imposing civil and criminal sanctions); Va. Code Ann. § 40.1-
11.1 (Supp. 2010) (imposing criminal sanctions); W. Va. Code Ann. § 21-1B-5(b) 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2010) (same). 
46. See Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 861 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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otherwise preempted by IRCA.47 Many of these subfederal laws have faced 
preemption challenges based on federal immigration law.48 To date, there are 
four federal court cases that directly consider whether IRCA expressly or  
impliedly preempts a subfederal employer-sanctions law.49 All four of these  
cases exclusively examine federal immigration law’s preemptive effect, with 
courts reaching an even split on the question.50  
Courts, using IRCA preemption analyses, have concluded that the laws of 
Oklahoma and Hazleton, Pennsylvania, largely do not survive Supremacy 
Clause scrutiny. In February 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth  
Circuit affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction, ruling that IRCA is 
likely to preempt the provisions of Oklahoma’s employer-sanctions law with 
one exception. It concluded that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim 
that IRCA’s preemption provision, which forbids subfederal governments from 
imposing civil or criminal sanctions, expressly preempts Oklahoma’s private-
right-of-action provision.51 Oklahoma’s law allowed an employee to bring suit 
for monetary damages against any employer who “terminate[s] an authorized 
 
47. Pham, supra note 20, at 789-91; Seth M.M. Stodder & Nicolle Sciara Rippeon, State 
and Local Governments and Immigration Law, 41 Urb. Law. 387, 418-26 (2009); see 
also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 2037, 
2056 (2008) (identifying the year 2006 as marking an important shift). 
48. Legal challenges to these subfederal laws are initiated by a variety of actors, span-
ning from business associations and chambers of commerce to labor unions and 
civil rights groups. See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 
742, 750 (10th Cir. 2010) (noting that the plaintiffs comprised “various chambers 
of commerce and trade associations”); Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 860 
(noting that the plaintiffs comprised labor associations, along with several “busi-
ness and civil-rights organizations”); Gray v. City of Valley Park, No. 
4:07CV00881 ERW, 2008 WL 294294 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008) (noting that the 
plaintiffs comprised several branches of the ACLU); Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 
496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 482-83 (M.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 620 
F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that the plaintiffs comprised the Hazleton Hispanic 
Business Association and branches of the ACLU). 
49. See Lozano, 620 F.3d 170; Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742; Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 
F.3d 856; Gray, 2008 WL 294294. 
50. See Lozano, 620 F.3d at 210-20 (concluding that IRCA impliedly preempts all  
aspects of Hazleton’s law and declining to rule on IRCA’s preemptive effects on 
Hazleton’s private cause of action); Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 765 (stating that 
“plaintiffs have demonstrated a strong likelihood that Section 7(C) is expressly 
preempted [by IRCA] and that Section 9 is conflict preempted”); Chicanos Por La 
Causa, 558 F.3d at 869 (declaring “that the district court correctly determined that 
the Act provides sufficient process to survive this facial challenge”); Gray, 2008 
WL 294294, at *31 (stating that “[t]he Ordinance at issue is not preempted by 
[IRCA], to the contrary, federal law specifically permits such licensing laws as the 
one at issue”). 
51. See Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 750. 
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worker while retaining an employee that the employer knows or reasonably 
should know is unauthorized to work.”52 The Tenth Circuit also determined 
that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that IRCA impliedly 
preempts Oklahoma’s independent-contractor provision, which extended the 
state law’s requirements beyond employers to independent contractors.53  
According to the Tenth Circuit, this provision conflicted with IRCA because 
IRCA focuses on employers, rather than independent contractors.54 The court, 
however, concluded that IRCA is not likely to preempt Oklahoma’s require-
ment that all public employers (including private employers that are working 
on government contracts) use the E-Verify system to verify their employees’ 
work authorization.55 
Like the Tenth Circuit in some respects, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit affirmed most of a district court’s permanent injunction,  
concluding that IRCA impliedly preempted all but one aspect of Hazleton, 
Pennsylvania’s employer-sanctions regime.56 Among other things, the court 
concluded that IRCA preempted Hazleton’s licensing provision and E-Verify 
requirement.57 Hazleton’s law required use of E-Verify by public and private 
employers58 and broadly stated that businesses may not “recruit, hire for  
employment, or continue to employ, or to permit, dispatch, or instruct any . . . 
unlawful worker . . . .”59 The Third Circuit concluded that Hazleton’s law placed 
additional burdens on employers and thereby conflicted with Congress’s careful 
balancing of interests in IRCA.60 Unlike the Tenth Circuit, however, the Third 
Circuit did not consider the constitutionality of Hazleton’s provision providing 
a private cause of action to coworkers of undocumented immigrant workers  
 
52. Id. at 750; see also Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 25, § 1313(B)(1) (2008) (“After July 1, 2008, 
no public employer shall enter into a contract for the performance of services 
within this state unless the contractor registers and participates in the Status Veri-
fication System to verify information of all new employees.”). 
53. See Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 750. 
54. See id. at 769-71. 
55. See id. at 771. For ease, this Article uses the term “public employer” to refer to 
both the government as a direct employer of employees and to private employers 
that are working on government contracts. 
56. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 210 (3d Cir. 2010). 
57. Id. 
58. See id. at 214 (concluding that Hazleton’s law explicitly requires public employers 
to use E-Verify and implicitly requires private employers to do so as well, for the 
law “provides its safe harbor only to employers who use E-Verify. In this way, [the 
law] significantly alters the risk calculus for employers, and coerces use of  
E-Verify”). 
59. Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, § 4(A) (Sept. 8, 2006). 
60. Lozano, 620 F.3d at 213. 
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because it determined that there was no plaintiff with standing to challenge that 
provision.61 
In contrast, two federal courts have found that IRCA does not preempt 
subfederal employer-sanctions laws in any way. A district court in Missouri 
concluded that IRCA did not preempt any aspect of the employer-sanctions  
regime of Valley Park, Missouri.62 Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit ruled that IRCA did not preempt Arizona’s employer-sanctions 
law, including its licensing requirement and E-Verify requirement for both 
public and private employers.63 Arizona’s law prohibits employers from “kno-
wingly employ[ing] an unauthorized alien.”64 It calls for the suspension of a 
business license or permit after a first violation (and revocation of the license or 
permit after a second violation during a probationary period).65 It also requires 
both public and private employers in Arizona to use E-Verify.66 The Ninth  
Circuit concluded that the licensing portion of Arizona’s law is a “licensing” law 
and therefore fell into IRCA’s savings clause.67 It also determined that Arizona’s 
E-Verify requirement was in line with IRCA’s goals to promote electronic  
verification and was, therefore, not preempted.68 The Supreme Court is  
currently reviewing the Ninth Circuit’s ruling on the constitutionality of Arizo-
na’s employer-sanctions law.69 Even if the Supreme Court resolves the question 
of whether IRCA preempts Arizona’s law, however, the case cannot fully resolve 
the constitutionality of provisions in other subfederal laws that do not parallel 
Arizona’s law.  
While all of these challenges focus on federal immigration law (IRCA)  
rather than federal employment law (notably, Title VII and FLSA), some IRCA-
based preemption arguments do consider to a limited extent IRCA’s workplace 
protections for marginalized employees.70 This is the case because IRCA itself 
 
61. Id. at 176. 
62. See Gray v. City of Valley Park, No. 4:07CV00881 ERW, 2008 WL 294294, at *31 
(E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008). 
63. See Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 869 (9th Cir. 2009). 
64. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-212(A) (Supp. 2010). 
65. Id. § 23-212(F)(2). 
66. Id. § 23-214(A). 
67. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 860. 
68. Id. at 867. 
69. 558 F.3d 856, cert. granted sub nom. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Candela-
ria, 130 S. Ct. 3498 (2010). 
70. See, e.g., Mark S. Grube, Note, Preemption of Local Regulations Beyond Lozano v. 
City of Hazleton: Reconciling Local Enforcement with Federal Immigration Policy, 
95 Cornell L. Rev. 391, 422 (2010) (referring to “IRCA’s balance of employer 
sanctions and antidiscrimination provisions” and noting that “[s]ome local  
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contains protections against two types of discrimination: citizenship-status  
discrimination and national-origin discrimination.71 These types of IRCA-
preemption arguments, however, have received only minimal traction in the 
courts so far. In the Hazleton case, the Third Circuit concluded that Hazleton’s 
law conflicted with IRCA’s intent to balance the competing interests of reducing 
employment of undocumented workers, keeping burdens on employers  
minimal, and deterring employment discrimination based on national origin 
and citizenship status.72 In contrast, the district court in Missouri found that 
IRCA did not preempt Valley Park’s law because the local law provided suffi-
cient protections against discrimination.73 The Ninth Circuit viewed the IRCA 
preemption issue as a facial challenge and did not find Arizona’s law discrimi-
natory on its face.74 The Tenth Circuit found all but one aspect of Oklahoma’s 
employer-sanctions law to be preempted but did not rely on an IRCA-
discrimination argument to do so.75  
Thus, despite intensive consideration of the constitutionality of subfederal 
employer-sanctions laws, courts have not considered federal employment law’s 
preemptive effects.76 Similarly, scholars have neglected federal employment law 
and have focused exclusively on federal immigration law’s preemptive effects. 
Some scholars argue for a broad view of federal control over immigration77 
 
ordinances have upset this careful balance by not only failing to include antidi-
scrimination provisions, but also by actually fostering discrimination”). 
71. See Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 § 102(1), 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1324b(a)(1) (2006). 
72. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 211-12 (3d Cir. 2010). 
73. Gray v. City of Valley Park, No. 4:07CV00881 ERW, 2008 WL 294294, at *15 (E.D. 
Mo. Jan. 31, 2008). 
74. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 861. The court did leave open the possibility, 
however, that discrimination may come up as part of a future as-applied challenge 
to the law. Id. (“We uphold the statute in all respects against this facial challenge, 
but we must observe that it is brought against a blank factual background of  
enforcement and outside the context of any particular case. If and when the  
statute is enforced, and the factual background is developed, other challenges to 
the Act as applied in any particular instance or manner will not be controlled by 
our decision.”). 
75. See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742 (10th Cir. 
2010). 
76. See Lozano, 620 F.3d at 201-10 (failing to consider employment law); Edmondson, 
594 F.3d at 765-70 (same); Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 863-67 (same); Gray, 
2008 WL 294294, at *8-19 (same). 
77. See, e.g., Michael A. Olivas, Preempting Preemption: Foreign Affairs, State Rights, 
and Alienage Classifications, 35 Va. J. Int’l L. 217, 236 (1994) (arguing for federal 
supremacy in immigration regulation); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigo-
try? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 
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(thereby calling for federal preemption of these subfederal employer-sanctions 
laws78), and others contend that subfederal governments have more leeway than 
previously thought.79 By filling this employment-law gap, this Article helps to 
resolve a pressing question about the constitutionality of subfederal employer-
sanctions laws.  
 
II. The Relevance of Federal Employment Law 
 
It is not surprising that preemption analyses of subfederal employer-
sanctions laws thus far have exclusively focused on whether IRCA’s federal em-
ployer-sanctions regime preempts its subfederal counterparts. After all, many 
subfederal employer-sanctions laws have requirements and prohibitions that 
are similar to IRCA’s in some ways. So why engage in a preemption analysis of 
 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 493, 567 (2001) (“States possess no power to regulate immigration, 
and the federal government may not devolve by statute its own immigration pow-
er. Accordingly, although states are plainly empowered to enact welfare rules  
pursuant to their traditional spending and police powers, those rules are entitled 
to none of the judicial deference reserved for exercises of the federal immigration 
power.”). 
78. See, e.g., Karla Mari McKanders, Welcome to Hazleton! ‘Illegal’ Immigrants Beware: 
Local Immigration Ordinances and What the Federal Government Must Do About 
It, 39 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 35, 35-45 (2007); Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related 
State and Local Ordinances: Preemption, Prejudice, and the Proper Role for  
Enforcement, 2007 U. Chi. Legal F. 27, 34. 
79. Peter Schuck, for example, argues that local “employer sanctions provisions that 
are carefully drafted to track the federal employer sanctions law” are not 
preempted. Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. 
Chi. Legal F. 57, 80; see also Matthew Parlow, A Localist’s Case for Decentralizing 
Immigration Policy, 84 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1061, 1062 (2007) (explaining “why local 
governments should be able to regulate in the immigration arena and supple-
ment—but not conflict with—federal efforts”). For arguments outside of the  
employer sanctions context that subfederal governments have more leeway than is 
traditionally thought, see Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of  
Immigration Federalism, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 787, 852-53 (2008) (contending that 
state and local governments are not foreclosed from regulating immigration); 
Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 
Mich. L. Rev. 567, 633-34 (2008) (acknowledging the federal government’s con-
tinued role in immigration regulation, but identifying some constitutional space 
for subfederal regulation); and Stodder & Rippeon, supra note 47, at 426 (stating 
that “state and local governments in fact have significant latitude when it comes 
to dealing with unauthorized aliens present within their jurisdictions”). For an  
argument in favor of expansive subfederal regulation of immigrants, see Kris W. 
Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of Law: What States Can and Should Do To Reduce Il-
legal Immigration, 22 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 459, 482 (2008) (“Those who claim that 
the states have no role in addressing the problem of illegal immigration are evi-
dently unaware of the substantial body of legal authority that exists to the con-
trary . . . .”). 
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subfederal employer-sanctions laws that is based on a seemingly far-removed 
area of federal law—federal employment law?80  
Federal employment law should be considered, not just because of the  
potential conflicts between employer-sanctions laws and employment laws  
described in the Introduction, but also because of the hybrid nature of these 
subfederal laws. Subfederal employer-sanctions laws are immigration-
employment law hybrids. As such, they implicate the federal employment regu-
latory regime along with the federal immigration regime. Moreover, while 
much is said about the federal government’s dominant interest in immigration 
regulation historically, this Part demonstrates that the federal government has 
had a profound (yet sometimes underappreciated) interest in federal employ-
ment regulation since the New Deal. By demonstrating the relevance of federal 
employment regulation, this Part sets the stage for Part III’s examination of the 
preemptive force of two federal employment laws (FLSA and Title VII) and Part 
IV’s revelation of the combined preemptive force of federal immigration law 
and federal employment policy.  
 
A. Subfederal Employer-Sanctions Laws as Immigration-Employment  
Hybrids 
 
Employment law is relevant to the question of whether federal law 
preempts subfederal employer-sanctions laws because subfederal employer-
sanctions laws are immigration-employment law hybrids. These subfederal laws 
cover areas that federal immigration regulations and federal employment regu-
lations already regulate. By definition, employer-sanctions laws, similar to  
federal employment laws, target the employment relationship between an  
employer and an employee or prospective employee.81 By giving employers the  
responsibility and power to verify an employee’s work authorization,82 and by 
restricting an employer’s employment decisions over hiring,83 these subfederal 
laws deal with the same employer-employee relationship, which is very much at 
the heart of federal employment laws. Similar to immigration laws, however, 
the primary aim of employer-sanctions laws is typically to reduce illegal immi-
gration. By this logic, these laws constitute a new hybrid breed of law, what I 
call “immployment” law.  
 
80. In no way does this Article argue that IRCA is not relevant to preemption analyses 
of subfederal employer-sanctions laws. Instead, the intent is to bring federal  
employment law into preemption analyses. 
81. See, e.g., Stumpf, supra note 38, at 1584 (stating that federal employer sanctions 
“more closely resembled classic state employment law in regulating hiring and 
termination, which are arguably the two most important employment deci-
sions”). 
82. E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-214(A) (Supp. 2010). 
83. E.g., Valley Park, Mo., Ordinance 1722, § 4A (Feb. 14, 2007). 
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Debates about IRCA’s preemptive effects indirectly reveal the hybrid immi-
gration-employment nature of subfederal employer-sanctions laws. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has affirmed that “IRCA forcefully made combating the  
employment of illegal aliens central to the policy of immigration law.”84 Courts 
and scholars, however, widely disagree about whether subfederal employer-
sanctions laws are employment laws or immigration laws. Courts and scholars 
who conclude that IRCA does not preempt subfederal employer-sanctions laws 
often characterize these subfederal laws as employment laws rather than immi-
gration laws.85 The legal relevance of this distinction, of course, is that federal 
immigration law is more likely to preempt a subfederal immigration law than a 
subfederal employment law.86 To the extent that these subfederal laws are  
employment laws, this view posits, states and local governments are acting 
squarely within their historic police powers to regulate the employment of the 
residents within their borders. As such, they are not stepping on the federal 
government’s preeminent power over immigration. On the other side of the 
debate, courts and scholars who are contending that IRCA does preempt subfe-
deral employer-sanctions laws often characterize these laws as immigration  
regulations and therefore conclude that they are preempted by IRCA.87  
Court analyses of labor- and employment-law claims on behalf of undo-
cumented employees further demonstrate that subfederal employer-sanctions 
laws are an immigration-employment law hybrid. The Supreme Court’s 2002 
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB decision,88 for instance, considered 
whether an undocumented employee who had committed an IRCA violation 
through his fraudulent use of someone else’s identification documents and had 
 
84. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002) (emphases 
added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
85. See, e.g., Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 984 (9th Cir. 
2009) (concluding that “because the power to regulate the employment of  
unauthorized aliens remains within the states’ historic police powers, an assump-
tion of non-preemption applies here”); Kris W. Kobach, Administrative Law: Im-
migration, Amnesty, and the Rule of Law, 36 Hofstra L. Rev. 1323, 1328 (2008)  
(referring to Arizona’s employer-sanctions law as an “employment law” and not-
ing that a federal appeals court declined to preempt it). 
86. Cf. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (holding that California’s employer-
sanctions law is not an immigration law and thus is not preempted); Stumpf,  
supra note 38, at 1565 (stating that when “courts view the subnational government 
as merely acting within its traditional spheres of power . . . the local rule stands a 
much greater chance of surviving”). 
87. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 768 n.29 
(10th Cir. 2010) (declining to use the presumption against preemption and finding 
Oklahoma’s law to be preempted); McKanders, supra note 78, at 28 (characteriz-
ing Hazleton’s law as a regulation of immigration and arguing in favor of preemp-
tion). 
88. 535 U.S. 137. 
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suffered a National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) violation when he was fired for 
engaging in union organizing could be awarded back pay as a remedy for his 
employer’s NLRA violation.89 The Hoffman Court considered the potential  
conflict between IRCA’s goals and the NLRA’s goals and concluded that award-
ing NLRA back pay to this employee would harm IRCA’s underlying policies.  
According to the Court, awarding the employee NLRA back pay would “en-
courage the successful evasion of apprehension by immigration authorities, 
condone prior violations of the immigration laws, and encourage future viola-
tions.”90  
By considering the intertwined relationship between immigration law and a 
workplace law, the Court engaged in what this Article refers to as an immploy-
ment-law analysis. In this way, the Court established a labor-law consequence 
(no NLRA back pay) for an employee’s immigration-law (IRCA) violation. It 
imported immigration-law priorities into its analysis of a federal workplace-law 
claim. Because Hoffman did not deal with state or local laws, the Supremacy 
Clause and preemption analyses were not directly relevant.91 The case, however, 
is instructive because the Hoffman Court identified and avoided a potential 
conflict92 between an employer-sanctions law (IRCA) and a federal workplace 
law (NLRA) by engaging in immployment-law analysis.  
In the wake of Hoffman, lower courts have continued to engage in what are 
essentially immployment-law analyses. These courts have been faced with a 
number of questions about whether and when federal employment laws, such 
as the Fair Labor Standards Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, must yield 
to federal employer-sanctions laws.93 Many lower courts have been reluctant to 
 
89. See id. at 137-38, 140-41. 
90. Id. at 151. 
91. Preemption analysis is not relevant when the potentially conflicting laws are both 
federal statutes. See N.Y. Tel. Co. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 539 
n.32 (1979); Marvin Tragash Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 524 F.2d 1255, 1257 (5th 
Cir. 1975); see also Ruby Ann David, Federal Preemption of a Federal Statute: The 
Case of Vornado Air Circulation Systems v. Duracraft Corporation, 37 Santa 
Clara L. Rev. 253, 253 (1996) (“Nowhere in the Constitution is it written that one 
federal statute can preempt another federal statute. Such a proposition is absurd 
considering two underlying assumptions regarding such statutes and their enact-
ment. First, is the assumption that there is no inherent hierarchy of importance 
among federal statutes. Second, is the assumption that Congress does not inten-
tionally pass conflicting laws.”). 
92. The sharply divided Hoffman Court concluded that, even without the NLRA’s 
back pay remedy, the federal interest in labor-law enforcement would still be 
served in cases involving similar undocumented employees through the NLRA’s 
other remedies for violations. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 152. 
93. There are myriad post-Hoffman legal questions about which rights and remedies 
are available to undocumented workers under federal labor laws as well as under 
federal employment laws and state workplace laws. See, e.g., Craig Robert Senn, 
Proposing a Uniform Remedial Approach for Undocumented Workers Under Federal 
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extend Hoffman into the federal employment-law context.94 These courts  
conclude that IRCA does not decrease an employee’s access to essential federal 
employment-law remedies.95 Some lower courts, however, have extended Hoff-
man’s rationale to the employment-law context, denying undocumented work-
ers back pay under Title VII because of IRCA.96 These courts’ analyses of IRCA 
in the context of labor- and employment-law disputes confirm the hybrid 
immployment-nature of employer-sanctions laws.97 
 
Employment Discrimination Law, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 113, 117 (2008) (“Depending 
upon the jurisdiction, circuit, or district, an undocumented worker’s remedial 
rights under federal employment discrimination law range from recovery of all of 
the available monetary remedies, to only some of those remedies, to none of those 
remedies.”). Professor Keith Cunningham-Parmeter recently developed an intri-
cate legal framework to address post-Hoffman tensions and ambiguities currently 
at issue in federal and state courts. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Redefining the 
Rights of Undocumented Workers, 58 Am. U. L. Rev. 1361, 1371-90 (2009); see also 
id. at 1371 (“Given the inconsistency among the responses to Hoffman, it is safe to 
say that immigrants’ rights will remain undefined for the indefinite future. This 
disarray underscores the need for a coherent framework . . . .”). 
94. See, e.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004) (distinguishing 
Hoffman and the NLRA from Title VII). 
95. See, e.g., id. at 1074-75 (holding that immigration status was not relevant during 
the discovery phase of litigation and stating, in dicta, that Hoffman should not  
affect Title VII remedies); Hernandez v. City Wide Insulation of Madison, Inc., 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86756, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 30, 2006) (“[D]efendants are 
unable to point to a single case in which a court has held that Hoffman stands for 
the proposition that FLSA defendants need not pay back wages actually earned by 
workers. Multiple courts have found that Hoffman does not stand for such a 
proposition.”). 
96. See, e.g., Escobar v. Spartan Sec. Serv., 281 F. Supp. 2d 895, 896-98 (S.D. Tex. 2003) 
(excluding back pay as a remedy for a Title VII violation); cf. Kati L. Griffith, 
Comment, A Supreme Stretch: The Supremacy Clause in the Wake of IRCA and 
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 41 Cornell Int’l L.J. 127, 131 (2008) (“[A] Florida 
district court in Veliz v. Rental Service Corp. USA, Inc. relied on Hoffman to hold 
that the IRCA preempted a state tort law remedy of lost future earnings to an  
undocumented worker who had violated the IRCA.”). 
97. In another context, scholars have widely noted the convergence of two formerly 
separate regulatory regimes: immigration and criminal law. See, e.g., Jennifer M. 
Chacon, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 135, 
137 (2009) (“[N]ot only are we seeing what Stephen Legomsky has termed the 
asymmetric incorporation of criminal justice norms into civil removal proceed-
ings, but we are also witnessing the importation of the relaxed procedural norms 
of civil immigration proceedings into the criminal realm.”); Stephen H.  
Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Crimi-
nal Justice Norms, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 469 (2007) (referring to the “criminali-
zation” of immigration law); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, 
Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 Am. U. L. Rev. 367, 376 (2006) (referring to these 
intersecting areas as “crimmigration”). 
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B. The Federal Government’s Interest in Employment Regulation 
 
It is also imperative to include federal employment law in preemption  
analyses of subfederal employer-sanctions laws because the federal government 
has a well-established interest in workplace regulation.98 The exclusive focus on 
federal immigration law’s preemptive effects on subfederal employer-sanctions 
laws overlooks the federal government’s significant interest in employment  
regulation. Employment regulation is sometimes characterized as “a quintes-
sential police function” of states.99 This characterization, however, ignores the 
federal government’s broad interest in labor and employment law. Before the 
New Deal, workplace regulation largely took place at the state and local levels.100 
Since the beginning of the New Deal period, however, federal regulation of the 
workplace has grown exponentially.101 In 1935, the NLRA provided many pri-
vate-sector employees across the United States with the right to unionize and to 
act collectively for their mutual aid and protection in the workplace.102 The Fair 
 
98. For an extensive analysis of preemption in the employment context, see Henry H. 
Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States: Preemption and the Second Twentieth 
Century Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 
469 (1993). 
99. Note, State Burdens on Resident Aliens: A New Preemption Analysis, 89 Yale L.J. 
940, 946 (1980); see also David Angueira & David Conforto, Without a Remedy: 
The Massachusetts Whistleblower’s Brush with ERISA, 39 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 955, 
959 (2006) (commenting that “federal preemption of state employment standards 
‘should not be lightly inferred’ since this area lies ‘within the traditional police 
power of the State’” (quoting Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 
(1994))). 
100. See Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New 
Deal Labor Legislation, 92 Yale L.J. 1357, 1357 (1983) (referring to the lack of federal 
employment regulation during the nineteenth century). 
101. See Nelson Lichtenstein, How Wal-Mart Fights Unions, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 1462, 
1462 (2008) (referring to “the phalanx of laws, administrative rulings, and  
enforcement mechanisms that constitute the governmental regulation of work 
and labor established in the United States during the decades of social reform that 
stretched from the Progressive Era, through the New Deal, and on into the 1960s 
and early 1970s”). See generally Jonathan Grossman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938: Maximum Struggle for a Minimum Wage, 101 Monthly Lab. Rev. 22 (1978) 
(describing President Roosevelt’s New Deal efforts to expand wage and child labor 
protections at the federal level). The federal government, however, has not  
expanded its reach into some areas of employment such as workers’ compensa-
tion. See, e.g., Anne Marie O’Donovan, Immigrant Workers and Workers’ Compen-
sation After Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 30 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & 
Soc. Change 299, 310 (2006) (contending that workers’ compensation is “an area 
of law which has always been controlled almost exclusively by state govern-
ments”). 
102. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2006)). While the NLRA is expansive, it also  
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Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) also illustrates a significant federal interest 
in regulating the workplace.103 It requires that employers pay a minimum wage 
and overtime to qualified employees and forbids some forms of child labor.104 
FLSA’s broad reach grows from FLSA’s expansive definition of “employee,”105 
which courts and the executive branch routinely reference.106 The U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor (DOL)’s website states that FLSA covers “more than 130 million 
workers, both full-time and part-time, in the private and public sectors.”107 
Moreover, the federal government significantly expanded its interest in 
employment regulation during the Civil Rights era. In 1963, Congress focused 
regulatory efforts on the nation’s agricultural industry. The Farm Labor Con-
tractor Registration Act of 1963 (FLCRA) was “the first major federal effort to 
improve the lot of agricultural laborers who have long been among the most 
exploited groups in the American labor force.”108 In 1964, Congress enacted 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”).109 Title VII demonstrates a signifi-
cant federal interest in eradicating employment discrimination based on sex, 
race, color, ethnicity, national origin, and religion.110 Three years after Title VII, 
Congress, with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), expressed 
 
excludes important segments of the workforce such as farm workers and domestic 
workers. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). For another example of federal expansion into the 
employment arena this same year, see Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 
Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
103. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2006)); see also Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight 
Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981) (stating that FLSA was “designed to . . . ensure 
that each employee covered by the Act would receive ‘[a] fair day’s pay for a fair 
day’s work’ and would be protected from ‘the evil of ‘overwork’ as well as ‘under-
pay’” (quoting Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 578 (1942)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
104. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207, 212. 
105. Id. § 203(e) (defining “employee” as “any individual employed by an employer”). 
106. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (referring to 
the “striking breadth” of FLSA’s definition of “employee”). 
107. Wages and Hours Worked: Minimum Wage and Overtime Pay, U.S. Dep’t Lab., 
http://www.dol.gov/compliance/guide/minwage.htm (last updated Sept. 2009). 
108. Caro-Galvan v. Curtis Richardson, Inc., 993 F.2d 1500, 1505 (11th Cir. 1993) (quot-
ing S. Rep. No. 93-1295, at 1-3 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6441, 6441-43) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
109. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
110. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-22 (1975) (contending that 
Title VII’s remedies advance the government’s interest in eradicating employment 
discrimination). 
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its goal to provide national protections for employees forty years of age or older 
from age discrimination.111 
Congress has continued to demonstrate an interest in employment regula-
tion since then as well. In 1970, Congress established national health-and-safety 
minimum standards through the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(OSHA).112 In 1974 it more extensively regulated employee pensions and benefit 
plans through the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).113 In 
1983, Congress expanded FLCRA’s protections of agricultural employees and 
enacted the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protections Act 
(AWPA).114 The 1990s also witnessed new federal regulatory measures in the 
employment area with the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990 (ADA)115 and 
the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) in 1993.116 
 In sum, because of the hybrid immigration-employment nature of subfe-
deral employer-sanctions laws and the federal government’s expansive interest 
in employment regulation, the constitutionality of subfederal employer-
 
111. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 
(2006)); see also McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357 (1995) 
(stating that Congress enacted the ADEA as part of a “congressional effort to era-
dicate discrimination in the workplace, reflect[ing] a social condemnation of in-
vidious bias in employment decisions”). 
112. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-
78 (2006)); see also Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992) 
(“In the OSH Act, Congress endeavored to assure so far as possible every working 
man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
113. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
61 (2006)); see also Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 99 n.20 (1983) (“The 
Report expressed approval of ERISA’s broad pre-emption of state law, explaining 
that ‘the Federal interest and the need for national uniformity are so great that  
enforcement of state regulation should be precluded.’” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 
94-1785, at 47 (1977))). 
114. Pub. L. No. 97-470, 96 Stat. 2583 (1983) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-
72 (2006)). For a federal workplace law passed in 1988, see Worker Adjustment 
and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-09 (2006) (requiring 
some employers to give employees prior notice about upcoming layoffs). 
115. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.  
§§ 12101-213 (2006)); see also Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 
U.S. 440, 446 (2003) (referring to the ADA and its “statutory purpose of ridding 
the Nation of the evil of discrimination”). 
116. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 6381-87 
(2006); 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (2006)); see also Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 
538 U.S. 721, 727 n.1 (2003) (“It is the purpose of this Act . . . to balance the  
demands of the workplace with the needs of families, to promote the stability and 
economic security of families, and to promote national interests in preserving 
family integrity.” (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1))). 
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sanctions laws should be evaluated through new preemption frameworks that 
integrate federal workplace law.  
 
C. Two Baseline Employment Laws: FLSA and Title VII  
 
 To derive a new preemption framework that considers federal workplace 
law, this Article focuses on two federal employment statutes in particular: the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(“Title VII”). These two federal statutes are critical to our federal workplace-law 
regime because they apply broadly and provide workplace protections to work-
ers at the bottom of our labor market. These workers include low-wage and 
immigrant workers and workers who are marginalized because of their mem-
bership in a protected class. As one scholar puts it, FLSA and Title VII are  
“arguably the most critical [employment statutes] given that they secure such 
fundamental workplace interests as freedom from discrimination and payment 
of wages.”117  
This Article focuses on these two statutes in particular because, when  
compared to the NLRA’s broad preemptive effects,118 their preemptive force is 
somewhat narrower. Given the immigration-employment hybrid analysis in 
Hoffman and its progeny,119 the NLRA is undoubtedly another relevant federal 
workplace law. Nonetheless, this Article addresses the more difficult question of 
whether the narrower preemption doctrines of Title VII and FLSA preempt 
subfederal employer-sanctions laws. Both Title VII and FLSA have been inter-
preted to serve as baseline standards that allow and encourage state and local 
initiatives that further their underlying policy goals.120 Subfederal governments 
 
117. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 93, at 1372; see also Benjamin I. Sachs,  
Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 2685, 2687 (2008) (“Faced 
with a traditional labor law regime that has proven ineffectual, workers and their 
lawyers are turning to employment statutes like the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as the legal guardians of their 
efforts to organize and act collectively.”). 
118. See generally Kati L. Griffith, The NLRA Defamation Defense: Doomed Dinosaur or 
Diamond in the Rough?, 59 Am. U. L. Rev. 1 (2009) (describing the NLRA’s broad 
preemptive effect). 
119. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002). 
120. Section 218 of FLSA, for instance, clarifies that FLSA does not “excuse noncom-
pliance with any . . . State law or municipal ordinance establishing a minimum 
wage higher than [FLSA minimum wage] or a maximum workweek lower than 
[FLSA’s maximum workweek].” 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) (2006). Title VII similarly 
promotes local laws that provide additional antidiscrimination protections in the 
workplace. See Stephen F. Befort, Demystifying Federal Labor and Employment 
Law Preemption, 13 Lab. Law. 429, 441 (1998) (stating that “federal antidiscrimina-
tion statutes do not preempt state law that is either consistent with or expands 
upon the rights conferred to employees by federal law”). The Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that Congress intended “state antidiscrimination laws” to play a 
Article - Griffith - 18 - Final - 2011.05.25 6/17/2011  3:14 PM 
DISCOVERING “IMMPLOYMENT” LAW  
 411 
can regulate in these employment areas, and have historically done so, but their 
requirements cannot go below the baseline protections of FLSA and Title VII. 
In contrast, the NLRA broadly “preempts any state regulation of activity that, 
although not directly regulated by the NLRA, was intended by Congress to be 
controlled by the free play of economic forces in a zone free from all regula-
tions, whether state or federal.”121 The NLRA’s broad preemption doctrine thus 
very well may preempt subfederal employer-sanctions laws. Part III of this  
Article, however, focuses on the more challenging question of whether Title VII 
and FLSA, which are more permissive of subfederal interventions, preempt  
subfederal employer-sanctions laws.  
 
III. Federal Employment Law’s Preemptive Effects  
 
A. An Implied-Obstacle-Preemption Framework 
 
This Section constructs an analytical framework for deciding whether FLSA 
and Title VII preempt subfederal employer-sanctions laws. Preemption analys-
es, which are targeted at revealing Congress’s intent,122 often start with a consid-
eration of “express preemption.” Express-preemption analyses consider wheth-
er the federal statute’s language explicitly preempts some, or all, aspects of 
subfederal laws. Since neither federal employment statute contains a preemp-
tion provision that expressly preempts subfederal laws,123 this Article develops 
an implied-preemption analysis.  
Implied-preemption analyses generally fall into three categories, two of 
which are not relevant here. First, federal law impliedly preempts a subfederal 
law when the federal law’s comprehensive coverage of a field implies that  
Congress intended to exclude state and local governments from acting in that 
entire area.124 This preemption category, however, is not relevant to this  
 
role in reaching the “goal of equal employment opportunity.” Cal. Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282-83 (1987). 
121. Paul M. Secunda, Toward the Viability of State-Based Legislation To Address 
Workplace Captive Audience Meetings in the United States, 29 Comp. Lab. L. & 
Pol’y J. 209, 212 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
122. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (affirming that Con-
gress’s intent is the touchstone of all preemption analyses). 
123. See 29 U.S.C. § 218; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (2006). 
124. See Susan J. Stabile, Preemption of State Law by Federal Law: A Task for Congress or 
the Courts?, 40 Vill. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1995) (“In the absence of an express preemption 
provision, under current doctrine, preemption may be implied from a pervasive 
scheme of federal regulation, in which case federal law is said to ‘occupy the 
field.’” (citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 84 (1990))). This type of  
implied-preemption analysis is often referred to as “field preemption.” See, e.g., 
Dayna B. Royal, Take Your Gun to Work and Leave It in the Parking Lot: Why the 
OSH Act Does Not Preempt State Guns-at-Work Laws, 61 Fla. L. Rev. 475, 484 
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Article’s proposed framework because it would be too strained to say that these 
federal employment laws, which do not refer to employer sanctions in any way, 
have occupied a field that covers employer-sanctions laws.125 Second, federal law 
impliedly preempts subfederal laws when it is impossible to comply with federal 
and subfederal laws at the same time.126 Since it is possible for an employer to 
comply with federal employment laws and subfederal employer-sanctions laws 
concurrently, this form of implied-preemption analysis is also not applicable 
here. An employer, for instance, can simultaneously comply with FLSA’s wage 
requirements and the verification procedures and prohibitions of subfederal 
employer-sanctions laws.  
It is the third category of implied preemption, commonly referred to as 
“implied obstacle preemption,”127 that therefore frames this Article’s analysis of 
federal employment law’s preemptive effects on the four subfederal employer-
sanctions laws. According to this type of implied-preemption analysis, federal 
law preempts subfederal laws when the subfederal laws “stand[] as an obstacle 
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”128 To examine whether a subfederal law serves as such an obstacle, 
courts consider the “entire scheme” of the federal statute and determine wheth-
er the federal law’s “operation within its chosen field . . . [is] frustrated and its 
provisions [are] refused their natural effect.”129 For instance, one federal court 
employed implied-obstacle-preemption analysis and determined that Title VII 
preempted a subfederal regulation that mandated breaks for female  
employees.130 The court reasoned that this regulation was an obstacle to Title 
VII because it made male employees more desirable to employers than female 
employees. The subfederal regulation, according to the court, contravened a 
 
(2009) (“Congress may intend that federal law ‘occup[ies] the field’ and governs 
the conduct exclusively, an arrangement called ‘field preemption.’” (alteration in 
original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 
U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000))). 
125. See Guerra, 479 U.S. at 281 (“Congress has explicitly disclaimed any intent categor-
ically to pre-empt state law or to ‘occupy the field’ of employment discrimination 
law.”); Williamson v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 208 F.3d 1144, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(stating that FLSA’s allowance of local laws that provide stricter protections is  
evidence that Congress did not intend to regulate the entire field of wage and 
hour law). 
126. English, 496 U.S. at 79. 
127. See, e.g., Deweese v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 590 F.3d 239, 246 n.9 
(3d Cir. 2009) (using the phrase “implied obstacle preemption”). 
128. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
129. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373 (citations omitted) (quoting Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 
533 (1912)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
130. Burns v. Rohr Corp., 346 F. Supp. 994, 997-98 (S.D. Cal. 1972). 
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“basic objective of Title VII,” which is “to cause employment to be based only 
upon applicable job qualifications” rather than the employee’s sex.131 
Despite its striking breadth,132 there are limits to implied-obstacle-
preemption analysis. The Supreme Court has declined to find implied preemp-
tion when the alleged conflict between subfederal and federal law is too specula-
tive.133 Moreover, the presumption against preemption134 is likely to be applica-
ble here.135 This canon of statutory interpretation requires an even stronger 
showing that Congress intended to preempt a particular subfederal law.  
According to this presumption, federal laws do not preempt subfederal laws 
that regulate “a field which the States have traditionally occupied” as part of 
their “historic police powers” unless “that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress.”136  
 
 
131. Id. Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Title VII 
impliedly preempted California’s state sovereign immunity law because it created 
an obstacle to an important policy goal of Title VII. See Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 
1451, 1460-61, 1461 n.4 (9th Cir. 1990). California’s law shielded state officials from 
Title VII liability. The court held that this subfederal law was in conflict with 
“Congress’s evident purpose in authorizing Title VII suits against states, state 
subdivisions, and state officials.” Id. at 1461 n.4. 
132. See Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 Geo. L.J. 2085, 2104 (2000) 
(“The operation of obstacle preemption significantly differs from express or con-
flict preemption because there is no direct conflict with any federal law precisely 
on point—for example, either the preemption provision or a primary regulatory 
provision. Obstacle preemption thus moves the displacement analysis along the 
spectrum away from the direct action extreme by both relaxing the standard for 
conflict—from direct conflict to obstacle to accomplishment—and expanding the 
evidence of congressional intent—from statutory text to purposes and objec-
tives.”). 
133. See Griffith, supra note 96, at 134-38 (describing Supreme Court precedent limit-
ing implied preemption). 
134. While some argue that its use “has receded of late,” courts do sometimes consider 
this canon of statutory interpretation. Catherine M. Sharkey, What Riegel Por-
tends for FDA Preemption of State Law Products Liability Claims, 102 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. Colloquy 415, 416 (2008). 
135. The De Canas Court unequivocally stated that subfederal employer-sanctions laws 
(at least as of 1976) fall within states’ historic police powers to “regulate the  
employment relationship to protect workers within the State.” De Canas v. Bica, 
424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976). There is a question, however, about whether this is still 
the case post-IRCA. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Edmondson, 
594 F.3d 742, 767 n.28 (10th Cir. 2010). For the sake of argument, this Article  
assumes that the presumption against preemption is in operation and highlights, 
when possible, Congress’s manifest purposes. 
136. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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The plain language of both FLSA and Title VII shows that Congress did  
intend both statutes to preempt subfederal laws that serve as obstacles to their 
underlying policies. Specifically, it demonstrates that both federal laws were  
intended to be absolute floors on employee rights and that subfederal laws 
could go above, but not below, those statutory floors. FLSA section 218, for  
instance, clarifies that FLSA does not “excuse noncompliance with any . . . State 
law or municipal ordinance establishing a minimum wage higher than [FLSA’s 
minimum wage] or a maximum workweek lower than [FLSA’s maximum work 
week].”137 Similarly, Title VII preempts any subfederal law that is “inconsistent 
with any of the purposes of this Act, or any provision thereof.”138  
Even though the analysis will assume that the presumption against preemp-
tion is operating, the question of whether there is a conflict between congres-
sional objectives and the subfederal laws is still the key inquiry. This question is 
critical because one way to show Congress’s manifest intent to preempt a subfe-
deral law, and therefore to overcome the presumption against preemption, is to 
demonstrate that there is a conflict between a subfederal law and the congres-
sional objectives underlying a federal statute.139 Thus, the remainder of this Part 
 
137. 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) (2006) (emphases added); see also Daniel V. Dorris, Comment, 
Fair Labor Standards Act Preemption of State Wage-and-Hour Law Claims, 76 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1251, 1260-61 (2009) (acknowledging that implied obstacle preemp-
tion is the most common preemption analysis in the FLSA context). 
138. 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (2006) (emphasis added). On the one hand, Title VII states 
that only subfederal laws that “purport[] to require or permit the doing of any act 
which would be an unlawful employment practice under [Title VII]” are 
preempted. Id. § 2000e-7. For an argument that Title VII’s preemptive effect 
should be read this narrowly, see Drummonds, supra note 98, at 540. On the other 
hand, Title XI of the Civil Rights Act, which a plurality of the Supreme Court says 
is “applicable to all titles of the Civil Rights Act,” Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. 
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282 (1987), declares that the federal statute preempts subfe-
deral laws that are “inconsistent with any of the purposes of this Act, or any provi-
sion thereof.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4. Along with its Guerra decision, the Supreme 
Court has subsequently acknowledged the applicability of implied obstacle 
preemption to the Title VII context in dicta. The Court, in International Union v. 
Johnson Controls, Inc., stated that Title VII’s implied obstacle preemption would 
come into play “[i]f state tort law furthers discrimination in the workplace.” 499 
U.S. 187, 210 (1991). A number of federal courts have similarly acknowledged im-
plied obstacle preemption in the Title VII context. See, e.g., Pascouau v. Martin 
Marietta Corp., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 15712, at *28-31 (10th Cir. July 14, 1999); Sosa 
v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1461 n.4 (9th Cir. 1990); Broughton v. Courtney, 861 
F.2d 639, 641 (11th Cir. 1988); Gray v. Webco Gen. P’ship, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1333-
35 (M.D. Fla. 1999); Thomas Publ’g Co. v. Div. of Human Rights, 456 F. Supp. 
1104, 1108 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
139. The presumption can be overcome in a number of ways. Most obviously, Con-
gress could include express language in a federal employment statute that demon-
strates its intent to preempt a subfederal law. The presumption can also be  
overcome, however, even when there is no express statutory language. According 
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considers whether subfederal employer-sanctions laws pose obstacles to  
Congress’s intent with respect to Title VII and FLSA.  
To evaluate whether there is a conflict between Title VII and FLSA, on the 
one hand, and the four subfederal employer-sanctions laws (as well as other 
subfederal laws that share their qualities), on the other, the analysis will set out 
Congress’s purposes with respect to both federal statutes. It will also examine 
whether subfederal employer-sanctions laws stand as obstacles to these purpos-
es by (1) comparing subfederal employer-sanctions laws to IRCA and (2) re-
viewing scholarship about the effects of IRCA’s employer-sanctions on federal 
workplace law. Even though the focus of this Part is on federal employment 
laws’ preemptive effects, comparisons to, and scholarship on, IRCA are instruc-
tive because IRCA is an employer-sanctions law and because it has been in  
operation much longer than the subfederal employer-sanctions laws at issue. As 
will be elaborated below, IRCA is qualitatively different in ways that ameliorate 
IRCA’s effects (albeit inadequately in my view) on federal employment laws. 
Without these ameliorative elements, subfederal employer-sanctions laws are in 
conflict with federal employment law. Moreover, research on IRCA’s effects 
provides insight into potential conflicts between employer-sanctions laws and 
federal employment laws. In fact, as the analyses below reveal, there is a grow-
ing body of literature that exposes the increased tension between immigration 
regulation and workplace regulation since IRCA’s enactment.140  
 
to the Supreme Court, Congress’s manifest purpose to preempt a local law can be 
established when the local law “produce[s] a result inconsistent with the objective 
of the federal statute.” Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 
(1973) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230)). This 
exception weakens the presumption against preemption. As Professor Richard 
Epstein put it, “for what the Court giveth . . . —the need to show a clear and  
manifest purpose—it taketh away in the . . . enumerated exceptions.” Richard A. 
Epstein, The Case for Field Preemption of State Laws in Drug Cases, 103 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. Colloquy 54, 58 (2008). 
140. See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Fear of Discovery: Immigrant Workers and 
the Fifth Amendment, 41 Cornell Int’l L.J. 27, 46 (2008); Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost 
Workers in an Interconnected World: Going Beyond the Dichotomies of Domestic 
Immigration and Labor Laws, 36 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 737 (2003); Griffith, supra 
note 14; Kim, supra note 15; Leticia M. Saucedo, A New “U”: Organizing Victims 
and Protecting Immigrant Workers, 42 U. Rich. L. Rev. 891 (2008); Michael J. 
Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 
497 (2004); Annie Decker, Comment, Suspending Employers’ Immigration-Related 
Duties During Labor Disputes: A Statutory Proposal, 115 Yale L.J. 2193 (2006). 
Moreover, sociologist Douglas Massey has shown that IRCA’s employer sanctions 
encouraged subcontracting, which further deregulated the workplace and eroded 
basic protections for documented and undocumented employees. See Douglas S. 
Massey et al., Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an 
Era of Economic Integration 120 (2002) (noting that some employers reduced 
wages to compensate for “the increased costs and risks” imposed by IRCA and 
that others “shifted to a pattern of indirect hiring through labor subcontractors”). 
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If IRCA is in tension with federal employment law, and subfederal employ-
er-sanctions laws go further than, and do not have the same safeguards as, 
IRCA, then subfederal employer-sanctions laws are likely to be in conflict with 
federal employment law. In other words, revealing the current tension between 
two federal regimes (federal employment law and IRCA) exposes an unconsti-
tutional conflict between a federal regime (federal employment law) and subfe-
deral employer-sanctions laws that extend beyond IRCA.  
As is elaborated in the remaining two Sections of this Part, there appear to 
be at least two substantial ways that these four subfederal employer-sanctions 
laws “stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of [Con-
gress’s] full purposes and objectives”141 in enacting FLSA and Title VII. They  
encourage employment discrimination and discourage employees, especially 
immigrant employees, from bringing valid complaints about federal employ-
ment-law violations to the attention of government officials or the courts. They 
thereby undermine protections for all workers. This Article takes each of these 
obstacles in turn, illuminating how these four subfederal employer-sanctions 
laws, as well as the many others that share their qualities, serve as barriers to 
federal employment-law goals. While the focus of this Part and Part IV is on 
subfederal laws as currently written, Part V will develop arguments for why  
subfederal employer-sanctions laws should be voided even if state and local 
governments amended their laws to replicate IRCA’s requirements, prohibi-
tions, and enforcement scheme exactly. 
 
B. Obstacle 1: Encouraging Employment Discrimination 
 
The four subfederal employer-sanctions laws are in conflict with Title VII 
because they stand as obstacles to Title VII’s most fundamental policy goal:  
eradicating specified forms of employment discrimination. Title VII’s language 
and Supreme Court interpretations of the statute demonstrate that Congress’s 
central purpose in passing this legislation was to eliminate employment  
discrimination based on the protected classes of sex, race, color, ethnicity,  
national origin, and religion.142 Congress’s protections against discrimination in 
the workplace are broad. Employers are forbidden from intentionally discrimi-
nating against employees because of their membership in a protected class.143 
 
141. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see also Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes 
Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (holding that Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration regulations preempt various Illinois licensing requirements for 
workers at certain hazardous waste facilities). 
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2006); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 
U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (“The language of Title VII makes plain the purpose of Con-
gress . . . to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fos-
tered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citi-
zens.”). 
143. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
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Title VII protects employees not just from intentional discrimination that they 
experience from employers and their agents but also from intentional discrimi-
nation that they experience at the hands of their coworkers. It outlaws hostile 
work environments based on sex, race, color, ethnicity, national origin, and re-
ligion.144 Even some forms of unintentional employment discrimination are also 
Title VII violations. For example, an employer is not allowed to utilize  
facially neutral employment practices that have a disparate impact on members 
of a protected class unless the employer has a sufficient business necessity for 
such practices.145  
As the Subsections below elaborate, both the ways in which these subfederal 
laws differ qualitatively from IRCA’s language, as well as the scholarship on 
IRCA’s effects on Title VII, demonstrate a conflict between subfederal employ-
er-sanctions laws and Title VII’s purposes. On their face, the subfederal laws do 
not provide the same safeguards against employment discrimination as IRCA. 
Moreover, unlike IRCA, their heavy reliance on complaints from average citi-
zens and coworker private causes of action fosters discriminatory harassment 
among coworkers. These subfederal laws also encourage employment discrimi-
nation because they place extra burdens on employers and expand the use of  
E-Verify beyond what IRCA requires. Thus, IRCA, when compared with subfe-
deral employer-sanctions laws, has more protections against discrimination, 
much less reliance on citizen complaints for enforcement, no allowance for  
coworker private causes of action, and fewer burdens and verification require-
ments on employers. IRCA, however, is already in considerable tension with 
Title VII’s main policy goal even though it contains these ameliorative elements. 
 
1. Inadequate Protections, Permissive Complaint Procedures,  
and Heightened Burdens 
 
Subfederal employer-sanctions laws are in conflict with Title VII because 
their protections against employment discrimination are inferior to IRCA’s. 
Unlike the subfederal governments at issue here, when Congress passed IRCA it 
acknowledged that IRCA’s employer sanctions could stand as an obstacle to 
Title VII’s goal to eradicate employment discrimination. In particular, Congress 
acknowledged that IRCA could unintentionally create incentives for employers 
to discriminate based on national origin or against non-nationals who have 
 
144. See id. § 2000e-2; Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). 
145. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (stating that an employer can defend itself by 
establishing that the practice is “job related for the position in question and con-
sistent with business necessity”); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 
(1971); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii), (C) (stating that a plaintiff can 
still prevail if the plaintiff shows that the employer refused the plaintiff’s proposed 
alternative employment practice and that the alternative practice will have a less 
severe disparate impact and will still satisfy the employer’s business needs). 
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work authorization.146 In other words, employers, fearful of liability, could  
decide not to hire someone with an accent, someone with a work visa, or some-
one who “looks foreign” for fear that they were going to violate IRCA. The 
House committee report on IRCA stated, for instance, that “every effort must 
be taken to minimize the potentiality of discrimination and that a mechanism 
to remedy any discrimination that does occur must be a part of this legisla-
tion.”147  
To attempt to remedy this situation, Congress included explicit antidiscri-
mination protections in IRCA. IRCA prohibits employers from discriminating 
against employees and prospective employees because of their national origin or 
citizenship status.148 It forbids employers from retaliating against employees 
who make, or who intend to make, IRCA discrimination complaints. Addition-
ally, IRCA restricts employers from asking for different and additional docu-
ments (beyond what the law requires) from any employee during the employee-
 
146. See IRCA Antidiscrimination Provisions, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., http://www.usda 
.gov/oce/labor/ina.htm (last modified May 16, 2006) (acknowledging that Con-
gress passed antidiscrimination protections to address the “fear that employers 
would overreact to the threat of sanctions and discriminate against individuals 
who sounded or appeared ‘foreign’”); see also Cynthia Bansak & Steven Raphael, 
Immigration Reform and the Earnings of Latino Workers: Do Employer Sanctions 
Cause Discrimination?, 54 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 275, 277 (2001) (“The possibili-
ty that employer sanctions could cause discrimination against legal immigrants 
figured prominently both in the 15-year legislative debate preceding the IRCA’s 
passage and in the eventual form of the legislation.”); Cunningham-Parmeter,  
supra note 93, at 1375 (“Legislators were concerned that the IRCA’s work verifica-
tion requirements would cause employers to discriminate against ‘foreign-
looking’ and ‘foreign-sounding’ job applicants.” (citing U.S. Gen.  
Accounting Office, Immigration Reform: Employer Sanctions and the 
Question of Discrimination 41-42 (1990), available at http://archive.gao.gov/ 
d24t8/140974.pdf)). 
147. H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 68 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, at 
5672 (emphasis added). 
148. See Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 § 102, 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1324b(a)(1) (2006). Employees are required to bring IRCA discrimination com-
plaints to an administrative agency. Unlike with Title VII, employees never gain 
the opportunity to pursue their claims in federal court. See Kenneth Juan Figue-
roa, Immigrants and the Civil Rights Regime: Parens Patriae Standing, Foreign  
Governments and Protection from Private Discrimination, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 408, 
423 n.84 (2002) (“IRCA does not provide for a private cause of action, but rather 
places the responsibility of enforcement on an agency, the Office of Special Coun-
sel on Employment Discrimination.”); Sandra F. Sperino, Complying with Export 
Laws Without Importing Discrimination Liability: An Attempt To Integrate  
Employment Discrimination Laws and the Deemed Export Rules, 52 St. Louis U. 
L.J. 375, 403 (2008) (“IRCA provides aggrieved individuals with an administrative 
enforcement mechanism, which does not provide a private cause of action in 
court.”). 
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verification procedure.149 Congress created the Office of Special Counsel for 
Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices in the Department of  
Justice to enforce IRCA’s antidiscrimination protections.150 Remedies for IRCA 
discrimination violations include injunctive relief, civil penalties, reinstatement, 
and back pay.151  
Despite these protections, IRCA has been found to have encouraged  
employment discrimination.152 A 1989 survey, conducted by the U.S. General 
Accounting Office, demonstrated that “10% of employers admitted to discrimi-
nating against people based on language, accent, or appearance because of fear 
of violating IRCA, and an additional 9% admitted to discriminating on the basis 
of citizenship status.”153 Moreover, in 1994, the U.S. Commission on Immigra-
tion Reform identified a “[p]attern of subjecting foreign-appearing workers to 
different or additional [verification] requirements.”154 IRCA’s track record  
 
149. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(6). 
150. Id. § 1324b(c). 
151. Id. § 1324b(g). 
152. See, e.g., Fredric J. Bendremer & Lisa A. Heiden, The Unfair Immigration-Related 
Employment Practices Provision: A Modicum of Protection Against National Origin 
and Citizenship Status Discrimination, 41 U. Miami L. Rev. 1025, 1054-55 (1987) 
(stating that “Congress, through employer sanctions, has, in fact, created an  
incentive for employers to discriminate on the basis of national origin and citizen-
ship status”); Pham, supra note 20, at 812 (“[O]ur experience with employer sanc-
tions shows that even when presented with valid documentation of legal status, a 
significant number of enforcers are likely to raise questions about the adequacy of 
the documents, particularly if applicants look or sound foreign.”). 
153. Oliveri, supra note 1, at 79 (citing U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, supra note 146, 
at 39). But see Pham, supra note 20, at 822-25 (referring to limitations in the Gen-
eral Accounting Office study, citing other sources that support GAO’s analysis 
and stating that “GAO attributed at least some of the discrimination it found to 
employer confusion about their obligations under federal employer sanctions”). 
154. Oliveri, supra note 1, at 79 (citing U.S. Comm’n on Immigration Reform, U.S. 
Immigration Policy: Restoring Credibility 80 (1994)); see Rachel E. Morse, 
Following Lozano v. Hazleton: Keep States and Cities Out of the Immigration Busi-
ness, 28 B.C. Third World L.J. 513, 532-33 (2008) (“Requiring employers to go to 
extra lengths to verify the immigration status of applicants is also likely to cause 
discrimination against applicants on the basis of race or appearance, with  
employers refusing to hire lawful minority residents rather than taking the time to 
determine whether every individual applicant is eligible for employment.”); 
Pham, supra note 20, at 823 (“In a 1988 survey of 400 employers in the New York 
City metropolitan area, the New York State Inter-Agency Task Force on Immigra-
tion Affairs found that 7% of the employers required only employees who look 
foreign or ‘risky’ to provide work authorization documents. In a 1989 survey of 
San Francisco employers, researchers found that 12% of the employers had differ-
ent work authorization procedures for foreign-born workers than for workers 
born in the United States.”). 
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suggests that subfederal employer-sanctions laws, which have even less protec-
tion against employment discrimination than IRCA, are likely to pose an  
obstacle to Title VII. In this way, the current tension between IRCA and Title 
VII further exposes the unconstitutional conflict between subfederal employer-
sanctions laws and Title VII.  
It is therefore critical that none of the subfederal employer-sanctions laws 
include the same protections against employment discrimination as IRCA’s. For 
example, Oklahoma’s law does not refer to discrimination in any way.155 The 
laws of Arizona; Valley Park, Missouri; and Hazleton, Pennsylvania, include a 
minor protection against discrimination, but it is much more limited than 
IRCA’s protections. They simply state that the subfederal government will not 
pursue complaints that are primarily based on the race, national origin, or  
ethnicity of the allegedly undocumented employees.156 Unlike IRCA, none of 
these subfederal laws explicitly prohibit employers from discriminating based 
on national origin or work-authorization status, from retaliating against em-
ployees who claim discrimination is taking place, or from requiring additional 
verification documents beyond what the federal government requires.157 Simi-
larly, none have designated an agency to enforce antidiscrimination protections.  
The complaint and investigation procedures of some subfederal laws, which 
are not modeled after IRCA, serve as additional obstacles to Title VII’s goals. 
The laws of Arizona, Hazleton, and Valley Park automatically initiate investiga-
tions in response to complaints by average citizens.158 In contrast, IRCA’s  
 
155. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 25, § 1313 (2008) (lacking a provision to protect against 
employer discrimination). 
156. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-212(B) (Supp. 2010); Valley Park, Mo., Ordinance 
1722, §§ 2(E), 4B(2) (Feb. 14, 2007); Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, § 4(B)(2) 
(Sept. 8, 2006). At least two other subfederal employer-sanctions laws share this 
quality. See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 285.535(2) (West Supp. 2010); Palmdale, Cal.,  
Ordinance, 1333 § 2.50.040(B) (Nov. 7, 2007). 
157. At least five states have provisions clarifying that their employee-verification re-
quirements should be “enforced” without regard to race, national origin or citi-
zenship status. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-2-122(5) (West Supp. 2010); Ga. 
Code Ann. § 13-10-91(c) (Supp. 2010); Miss. Code Ann. § 71-11-3(2) (Supp. 2010); 
S.C. Code Ann. § 8-14-30 (Supp. 2010); Utah Code Ann. § 63G-11-103(2)(b) 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2010). 
158. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-212(B) (“On receipt of a complaint on a prescribed 
complaint form that an employer allegedly knowingly employs an unauthorized 
alien, the attorney general or county attorney shall investigate whether the em-
ployer has violated subsection A of this section.”); Valley Park, Mo., Ordinance 
1722, § 4B(1) (“An enforcement action shall be initiated by means of a written 
signed complaint to the Valley Park Code Enforcement Office submitted by any 
City official, business entity, or City resident.”); Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, 
§ 4(B)(1) (“An enforcement action shall be initiated by means of a written signed 
complaint to the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office submitted by any City offi-
cial, business entity, or City resident.”). Other subfederal employer-sanctions laws 
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enforcement scheme is not necessarily set into motion in response to com-
plaints from the public. The federal government will consider only those citizen 
complaints that “have a substantial probability of validity.”159 Moreover, Okla-
homa’s law allows coworkers to bring private suits against their employers 
when they believe their employer has hired an undocumented worker.160 Simi-
larly, Hazleton’s law “makes it ‘an unfair business practice’ for a business entity 
to discharge ‘an employee who is not an unlawful worker,’ if, on the date of the 
discharge, ‘the business entity was not participating in [E-Verify] and the busi-
ness entity was employing an unlawful worker.’”161 Employees can sue under 
Hazleton’s provision for triple damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs.162 IRCA does 
not allow for private causes of action; only the federal government can bring 
IRCA enforcement actions.163  
The complaint and investigation schemes of these four subfederal laws, 
which more readily initiate investigations based on citizen complaints and allow 
coworker causes of action, invite invidious employment discrimination based 
on such characteristics as accent, race, and national origin.164 In other words, 
 
share this quality. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:996A (Supp. 2010); Mo. Rev. 
Stat. §§ 285.535(2); S.C. Code Ann. § 41-8-50(A). 
159. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(1)(B) (2006). 
160. See, e.g., Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 25, § 1313(C). At least four additional states have 
employer-sanctions provisions that allow employees, under certain circums-
tances, to sue their employers for employing undocumented workers. See Miss. 
Code Ann. § 71-11-3(4)(d); Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-305(3) (2009); S.C. Code 
Ann. § 41-1-30(a); Utah Code Ann. § 63G-11-103(4)(a), (c). In South Carolina, 
prevailing plaintiffs receive lost wages, actual damages, and reinstatement. See S.C. 
Code Ann. § 41-1-30(d)(1)-(3). 
161. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 179 (3d Cir. 2010). The Third Circuit did 
not consider the constitutionality of this provision because the plaintiffs lacked 
standing to challenge it. Id. at 187-89. Oklahoma’s private-right-of-action provi-
sion is similar. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 25, § 1313(C) (allowing employee complaints 
when an employer “discharge[s] an employee . . . who is a United States citizen or 
permanent resident alien while retaining an employee who the employing entity 
knows, or reasonably should have known, is an unauthorized alien”). The Tenth 
Circuit recently affirmed a preliminary injunction against this provision. See 
Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 766 (10th Cir. 
2010). 
162. Lozano, 620 F.3d at 179. 
163. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(9) (making no mention of private enforcement and pro-
viding that only the Attorney General “shall file a suit to seek compliance with the 
order in any appropriate district court of the United States”). 
164. See Grube, supra note 70, at 423 (acknowledging that “[r]esidents could easily use 
these ordinances as a tool for harassing minorities.”). The author proposes that 
“[i]f municipalities choose to impose licensing penalties following the procedures 
of [IRCA], they should also provide protections to minority employees compara-
ble to those in [IRCA].” Id.; see also Nchimunya D. Ndulo, Note, State Employer 
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they conflict with Title VII’s goal to deter employment discrimination. Deter-
mining an individual’s immigration status is not an easy thing to do.165 It can be 
especially difficult for an average citizen or coworker who does not have access 
to accurate employee-verification information. In fact, some have argued that 
the citizen-complaint procedures of subfederal employer-sanctions laws induce 
citizens to make discriminatory complaints “against business entities based on 
[the businesses’] employment of Hispanics.”166  
Moreover, because an employee will most often have no basis for believing 
that a coworker is undocumented (other than that coworker’s race, accent, or 
national origin), the complaint and private-causes-of-action provisions create 
new vehicles for discriminatory workplace harassment based on race and  
national origin. A recent Title VII case illustrates the potential danger of provid-
ing citizens and coworkers with the power to “identify” undocumented work-
ers. In Chellen v. John Pickle Co., a federal district court concluded that the em-
ployer and its employees created a hostile work environment based on national 
origin in violation of Title VII. One of the many derogatory comments about 
the Indian workers in that case included the following statement from a co-
worker: “[H]e’s an Indian. He’s no good. And, you know, we’ll send him 
back.”167 Despite this employee’s assertion that he somehow had the power to 
 
Sanctions Laws and the Federal Preemption Doctrine: The Legal Arizona Workers 
Act Revisited, 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 849, 877 (2009) (“The fact that mem-
bers of the public can initiate complaints raises concerns about the use of discri-
minatory practices and malicious intent in making such complaints. . . . Such 
complaints may be initiated solely on the basis of race or language abilities,  
accents, and other racially targeted and unlawful characteristic determinations.”). 
165. See Grube, supra note 70, at 423 (“Further, the parties enforcing local regula-
tions—employers, citizens, and local police—have less training in immigration 
law than federal authorities and are more likely to resort to proxies—such as race 
or ethnicity—to determine an individual’s immigration status.”); Michael M. 
Hethmon, The Chimera and the Cop: Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration 
Law, 8 UDC/DCSL L. Rev. 83, 130 (2004) (identifying the argument that “federal 
immigration law is a complicated body of law that requires extensive training and 
expertise to properly enforce, because there are many different ways for people to 
be lawfully present in the United States and the federal government issues many 
different types of documents that entitle such lawful presence”); Pham, supra note 
20, at 781 (“Private parties, not trained in immigration law and not given clear  
legal guidelines, are likely to make mistakes.”). 
166. Gray v. City of Valley Park, No. 4:07CV00881 ERW, 2008 WL 294294, at *19 (E.D. 
Mo. Jan. 31, 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Nat’l Immigra-
tion Law Ctr., Erecting Its Own Tombstone: Arizona’s Mandatory Basic 
Pilot/E-Verify Law (2008), available at http://www.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/ 
state_local/AZ_factsheet_2008—04-25.pdf (referring to allegations in a lawsuit 
that a subfederal employer-sanctions law discriminated against foreign-born 
workers). 
167. Chellen v. John Pickle Co., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1266 (N.D. Okla. 2006). 
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send his coworker back to India, the Indian worker-plaintiffs were not actually 
undocumented.168  
Finally, when subfederal laws place additional burdens and penalties on 
employers (beyond IRCA) they increase the incentives for employers to discri-
minate based on race and national origin in order to avoid new forms of poten-
tial liability under the subfederal law.169 Congress arguably kept burdens on 
employers minimal, at least in part, to reduce incentives for employers to dis-
criminate.170 Adding additional burdens and penalties on employers, such as in-
tensified verification requirements, revocation of a business license after a  
subfederal adjudication,171 or the payment of triple damages to an employee, 
raises the stakes for employers.172 If IRCA already encourages employers to  
 
168. As the court concluded, the “plaintiffs were not ‘undocumented.’ They had visas, 
albeit ones that did not permit them to work in the United States . . . [because of] 
the failure of defendants to obtain proper visas.” Id. at 1277 n.9. 
169. See, e.g., Amy Pritchard, “We Are Your Neighbors”: How Communities Can Best 
Address a Growing Day-Labor Workforce, 7 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 371, 395 (2008) 
(referring to local laws that create criminal sanctions for the use or day laborers 
and stating that “[t]hese types of ordinances may encourage a system where some 
employers discriminate against all Latino workers, rather than face penalties for 
mistakenly hiring someone who is unauthorized”). 
170. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 211 n.33 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Not only is 
[placing penalties on private employers] unfair to private employers, but it will 
cause them, out of fear, to discriminate against prospective employees who are 
‘foreign-looking.’” (quoting 132 Cong. Rec. H10,583-01 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986))). 
171. There are at least six states and two municipalities that require the suspension or 
revocation of a business license as a consequence for violating the subfederal em-
ployer-sanctions laws. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-212(F)(1)(c) (Supp. 2010); 
Miss. Code Ann. § 71-11-3(7)(e)(i) (Supp. 2010); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 
285.535(5)(2)(a)-(b) (West Supp. 2010); S.C. Code Ann. § 41-8-50(D)(2)-(4) 
(Supp. 2010); Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-103(e)(1)(A)-(B) (2008); W. Va. Code 
Ann. § 21-1B-7(a)(1)-(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010); Lancaster, Cal., Code of 
Ordinances § 5.50.040(B) (2009); Beaufort County, S.C., Code of Ordin-
ances § 18-69(e)(1) (2006). At least five states and two municipalities revoke a 
public contractor’s state contract for violating an employer-sanctions law. For the 
state provisions, see Ark. Code Ann. § 19-11-105(7)(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 2009); Colo. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-17.5-102(3) (West Supp. 2010); Miss. Code Ann. § 71-11-
3(7)(e)(i); Mass. Exec. Order No. 481, 1073 Mass. Reg. 7 (Mar. 9, 2007); and Minn. 
Exec. Order No. 08-01, 32 Minn. Reg. 1284 (Jan. 14, 2008). For the municipal pro-
visions, see Lakewood, Cal., Municipal Code § 01.42.40(b) (2009); and Palm-
dale, Cal., Ordinance 1333, § 40(d) (Nov. 7, 2009). At least three states make a 
public contractor ineligible for future contracts with the state for a given period of 
time as a consequence of violating an employer sanction law. See Colo. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 8-17.5-102(4); Miss. Code Ann. § 71-11-3(7)(e)(i); Tenn. Code Ann. 
§ 12-4-124(b). 
172. Similarly, at least fifteen subject employers who violate employer-sanctions re-
quirements to criminal liability. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-2-122(4); Fla. 
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intentionally discriminate to some extent, subfederal laws that add require-
ments for employers and intensify the consequences for employer violations173 
are in conflict with Title VII’s purpose to deter employment discrimination.  
 
2. Mandatory E-Verify Requirements 
 
The mandatory E-Verify requirements of subfederal employer-sanctions 
laws deserve special attention because E-Verify’s discriminatory effects have 
been extensively studied. These mandatory requirements serve as an additional 
obstacle to Title VII’s antidiscrimination goals. Studies show that IRCA’s volun-
tary E-Verify system,174 which Congress extended through September 3, 2012,175 
already encourages unintentional employment discrimination.176 Because E-
Verify relies heavily on the Social Security database, it is more likely to lead to 
mistakes with respect to employees from countries outside of the United States, 
who may have names with uncommon spellings or sequencing of last names,  
 
Stat. Ann. § 448.09(2) (West Supp. 2010); Idaho Code Ann. § 44-1005 (2003); 
Iowa Code Ann. § 715A.2A(3)(a)-(b) (Supp. 2010); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26,  
§ 871(2) (2007); Miss. Code Ann. § 71-11-3(8)(c)(i); Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-
305(1)-(2) (2009); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 360.796(3) (LexisNexis 2009); N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 34:9-1 (West Supp. 2000); Or. Rev. Stat. § 658.453(1) (2009); S.C. 
Code Ann. § 41-8-50(D)(1); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 444a(d) (Supp. 2009); Va. 
Code Ann. § 40.1-11.1 (2002); W. Va. Code Ann. § 21-1B-5(b)(1-3); Mass. Exec. 
Order No. 481, 1073 Mass. Reg. 7. 
173. Some states impose a penalty of imprisonment for both public and private em-
ployers who violate a subfedral employer sanction law. See Fla. Stat. Ann.  
§ 448.09(3); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4409(b) (2007); Miss. Code Ann. § 71-11-
3(8)(c)(i); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 8-14-60, 41-8-70; W. Va. Code Ann. § 21-1B-
5(b)(3). 
174. See Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 § 101(b), 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1324a(b) (2006). 
175. See Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-83, § 547, 123 Stat. 2142, 2177 (2009). 
176. See Westat, Findings of the Web Basic Pilot Evaluation, at xxv (2007), 
available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/WebBasicPilotRprtSept2007.pdf 
(stating that “[f]oreign-born U.S. citizens are considerably more likely to receive 
erroneous tentative nonconfirmations than are work-authorized foreign-born 
persons who have not become U.S. citizens”); Ndulo, supra note 164, at 875-76 
(stating that “[a] congressional audit from 2006 indicated that ‘4 percent of the 
time E-Verify. . . initially labeled workers ineligible for employment when in fact 
they had work authorization’” (quoting Daniel González, Sanctions Law Begins: 
Many Ariz. Businesses Are Still Unprepared, Ariz. Republic, Jan. 2, 2007, 
http://www.azcentral.com/specials/special46/articles/1230 sanctionsstart.html (last 
visited May 1, 2011))). 
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middle names, and first names.177 A 2007 report to the U.S. Department of Ho-
meland Security concluded that “the database used for verification is still not 
sufficiently up to date to meet the [federal immigration law’s] requirement for 
accurate verification.”178 It concluded that “improvements are needed, especially 
if the Web Basic Pilot [E-Verify] becomes a mandated national program”179 and 
that it “will take considerable time and will require better data collection and 
data sharing between [Social Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servic-
es (USCIS)], and the U.S. Department of State than is currently the case.”180  
A 2009 U.S. Department of Homeland Security report on IRCA demon-
strated some improvements from earlier years but illustrated continued prob-
lems with employment discrimination related to the E-Verify program. For  
instance, between April and June of 2008, foreign-born workers were “more 
than 20 times more likely than U.S.-born workers” to receive a “Tentative Non-
confirmation” (TNC) from the E-Verify system.181 Similarly, work-authorized 
non-citizens were more likely to receive TNCs than their U.S.-citizen and  
lawful-permanent-resident counterparts. The error rate for work-authorized 
non-citizen workers was 5.3 percent. In contrast, U.S. citizens experienced a 0.3 
percent error rate and lawful permanent residents experienced a 1 percent error 
 
177. See, e.g., Doris Meissner & Marc R. Rosenblum, Migration Policy Inst., 
The Next Generation of E-Verify: Getting Employment Verification 
Right 6 (2009) (“Many names have multiple possible spellings, especially in the 
case of transliterations from non-Latin alphabets. Some immigrants come from 
cultures in which naming and name-order conventions differ from those in the 
United States, making them more prone to such errors.”); Oliveri, supra note 1, at 
116 (“The Social Security Administration’s database is riddled with errors, which 
are caused by data-entry mistakes, inconsistent transliteration of foreign names, 
applicants who use a less ‘foreign’ sounding first name for work purposes, and 
different naming conventions that are common in many parts of the world (such 
as multiple surnames, or the inversion of family name and given name).”). 
178. See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 753 (10th Cir. 
2010) (quoting Westat, supra note 176, at xxi); cf. Westat, supra note 176, at 
xxviii (“[T]he overall percentage of cases authorized automatically has increased 
over time. Yet, there are significantly different rates between noncitizen cases and 
citizen cases. On average, 96 percent of employees attesting to being U.S. citizens 
were found to be work-authorized automatically, while, on average, 72 percent of 
cases in which the employee attested to being a lawful permanent resident and 63 
percent of cases in which the employee attested to being an alien authorized to 
work were authorized automatically.”). 
179. Westat, supra note 176, at xxi. 
180. Id. at xxvi. Despite criticism, the federal government now requires federal gov-
ernment contractors to use the E-Verify system instead of the I-9 process. Exec. 
Order No. 13,465, 73 Fed. Reg. 33,285 (June 11, 2008). 
181. Westat, Findings of the E-Verify Program Evaluation, at xxxv  
(2009), available at www.uscis.gov/USCIS/E-Verify/E-Verify/Final%20E-Verify% 
20Report%2012-16-09_2.pdf. 
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rate.182 TNCs have real impacts. Workers who receive TNCs must resolve the 
inconsistency with the Social Security Administration or the Department of 
Homeland Security within a specified period, or they will lose the opportunity 
to work.183 Sometimes, employers engage in intentional discrimination and take 
adverse employment actions against employees who receive TNCs.184 Other 
times, employees, even if they are work-authorized, mistakenly receive final 
nonconfirmation, which ends their opportunities for employment in the Unit-
ed States.185  
 
182. Id. The E-Verify system has an adverse impact on naturalized citizens as well. The 
2009 Department of Homeland Security report states that, “[a]lthough much  
improved since the last evaluation, the erroneous TNC rate for naturalized  
citizens remains well above the rate for U.S.-born workers.” Id. at xxxv-xxxvi 
(identifying a disparity of 3.2 percent versus 0.1 percent for U.S.-born workers); 
see also Oliveri, supra note 1, at 116 (“[T]hese databases are filled with inaccuracies, 
and these inaccuracies disproportionately work to the detriment of noncitizens 
and naturalized citizens.”). 
183. See Westat, supra note 183, at xxvi (“When a TNC is issued, employers are  
required to inform affected workers in writing of the E-Verify finding and their 
right to contest the finding. If any discrepancies with SSA or DHS records are re-
solved by the worker during the contesting process, E-Verify issues an employ-
ment-authorized finding. When workers say that they do not want to contest 
TNCs or fail to contact SSA or USCIS within 10 Federal workdays, the E-Verify 
system issues a Final Nonconfirmation (FNC) finding and employers are expected 
to promptly terminate the workers’ employment.”). 
184. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO 11-146, Employment Verifica-
tion: Federal Agencies Have Taken Steps To Improve E-Verify, but  
Significant Challenges Remain 41 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d11146.pdf (“Employees may be vulnerable to discrimination under E-
Verify if, for example, employers engage in practices prohibited by E-Verify, such 
as limiting the pay of or terminating employees who receive TNCs, or prescreen-
ing job applicants. In 2009, Westat reported that some employers who responded 
to its survey acknowledged engaging in such practices. Specifically, of 2,320 survey 
respondents, 17.1 percent (397) reported restricting work assignments until em-
ployment authorization was confirmed; 15.4 percent (357) reported delaying train-
ing until employment authorization was confirmed; and 2.4 percent (56) reported 
reducing pay during the verification process.”); Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and 
‘Aliens’: Privacy Expectations and the Immigration Raids, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 
1081, 1097 (2008) (identifying the problem of “adverse employer action[s] against 
workers who receive a tentative nonconfirmation in the first phase of verifica-
tion”); New Rule Requires Increased Use of Employment Verification System, 42 
Clearinghouse Rev. 322, 323 (2008) (“Employers . . . have been found to penal-
ize those who receive tentative nonconfirmation notices.”). 
185. See Shelly Chandra Patel, Note, E-Verify: An Exceptionalist System Embedded in 
the Immigration Reform Battle Between Federal and State Governments, 30 B.C. 
Third World L.J. 453, 463-64 (2010) (citing an “independent examination of the 
E-Verify program” and stating that final nonconfirmation for a work-authorized 
employee “often results when the employee did not follow proper procedures to 
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The problem with all four of the subfederal employer-sanctions laws, and 
the reason they conflict with Title VII, is that they expand the use of E-Verify 
beyond what the federal government allows. Some subfederal employer-
sanctions laws, such as Arizona’s law and Hazleton’s law, require private em-
ployers, as well as public employers at the subfederal level, to use the E-Verify 
system.186 Others, such as Oklahoma’s law, require E-Verify only with respect to 
public employers and employers that are working on government contracts.187 
Even though the federal government’s voluntary use of E-Verify signals that  
E-Verify does not appear to be in conflict with Title VII, the subfederal laws’ 
expanded use of E-Verify tips the balance such that E-Verify is much more like-
ly to have a discriminatory effect on employees because of their national origin 
or race.  
 
contest or, alternatively, was not aware of either the TNC or the opportunity to 
contest because his employer failed to initiate a SSA referral. . . . The difficult 
question, and one that currently remains unanswered, is what recourse is available 
to legal residents who are subject to final nonconfirmation under the E-Verify  
system?”); E-Verify in Arizona—How Is It Working for Your Business?: Questions & 
Answers from CIS Ombudsman’s Teleconference, U.S. Dep’t Homeland Security, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_1215715302905.shtm (last modified Oct. 
29, 2008) (“There is not a formal appeals process for final nonconfirmations  
issued by the E-Verify, though the E-Verify program will delay a final nonconfir-
mation finding on a case by case basis if employees have experienced delays in  
receiving needed documentation that will help prove their employment eligibili-
ty.”). 
186. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-214(A) (Supp. 2010) (applying a mandatory E-Verify 
requirement to all private and public employers); Valley Park, Mo., Ordinance 
1722, § 4(C)-(D) (Feb. 14, 2007) (applying a mandatory E-Verify requirement to 
city employers and private employers who seek a contract with the city); Hazle-
ton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, § 4(C)-(D) (Sept. 8, 2006) (same). The Lozano court 
concluded that Hazleton’s law indirectly required private employers to use  
E-Verify because the use of E-Verify gave these employers a “safe harbor” from 
the law. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 214 n.35 (3d Cir. 2010). The Val-
ley Park law has a similar safe harbor and thus may also be viewed as requiring 
public and private employer use of E-Verify. See Valley Park, Mo., Ordinance 
1722, § 4B(5). At least two other states and one city require E-Verify for both  
private and public employers. See Miss. Code Ann. § 71-11-3(4)(b)(i) (Supp. 
2010); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 41-8-20(B)(1), 8-14-20(A) (Supp. 2010); Lancaster, 
Cal., Code of Ordinances § 5.50.030(A) (2009). 
187. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 25, § 1313(A)-(B) (2008). For examples of E-Verify  
requirements for public employers in other states and municipalities, see Colo. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-2-122 (West Supp. 2010); Ga. Code Ann. § 13-10-91(a) (Supp. 
2010); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 285.530(2)-(3) (West Supp. 2010); Neb. Rev. Stat.  
§ 4-114(2) (Supp. 2010); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 126-7.1(f) (West Supp. 2010); Va. 
Code Ann. § 40.1-11.2 (Supp. 2010); Decatur, Ala., Resolution No. 09-141 (June 1, 
2009); Lakewood, Cal., Municipal Code § 01.42.030(a) (2009); Palmdale, Cal., 
Ordinance 1333, § 2.50.030(A)-(B) (Nov. 7, 2007); and Bonita Springs, Fla., Ordin-
ance 09-04, § 4(C) (Mar. 19, 2009). 
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C. Obstacle 2: Discouraging Enforcement Through Employee-Initiated  
Complaints 
 
The four subfederal employer-sanctions laws also pose a barrier to a fun-
damental, yet less obvious, policy that underlies both Title VII and FLSA: the 
promotion of employee-initiated complaints. Title VII’s and FLSA’s most  
obvious policy goals are, respectively, to protect marginalized employees from 
employment discrimination and to protect employees at the bottom of the  
labor market from minimum-wage, child-labor, and overtime abuses.188 As 
stated by the Supreme Court in its landmark 1971 decision in Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., Title VII’s main goal was “to achieve equality of employment oppor-
tunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifia-
ble group of white employees over other employees.”189 Similarly, FLSA’s legis-
lative history suggests that FLSA “is intended to give a certain degree of 
protection to a group of people who cannot speak for themselves, who are un-
organized and politically and economically powerless.”190  
A recent case in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit shows that 
a federal employment law can preempt subfederal laws that contravene the  
federal law’s enforcement scheme.191 In that case, FLSA preempted state law, not 
because state law directly lowered the federal minimum wage or overtime  
premium, but because it served as an obstacle to FLSA’s enforcement scheme. 
Specifically, the court found that FLSA preempted an employee’s state negli-
gence, fraud, and contract claims in the context of a minimum-wage case.192 
Plaintiffs had brought state-law claims based on the employer’s alleged FLSA 
violations and thus sought state-law remedies for the FLSA violations.193 Noting 
 
188. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060, 1060-69 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006)); Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
189. 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). 
190. 82 Cong. Rec. 1491 (1937). 
191. See Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 193-94 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Vicki 
C. Jackson, Printz and Testa: The Infrastructure of Federal Supremacy, 32 Ind. L. 
Rev. 111, 131 n.84 (1998) (indicating that federal procedural rights can preempt 
state law as long as the procedural rights are related to a “substantive federal  
statutory purpose”). 
192. See Anderson, 508 F.3d at 194 (finding implied preemption). In contrast, the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that FLSA did not preempt a similar sub-
federal law. See Williamson v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 208 F.3d 1144, 1152 (9th Cir. 
2000) (finding against preemption of state fraud claims). 
193. Anderson, 508 F.3d at 193. 
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FLSA’s “unusually elaborate enforcement scheme,”194 the Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that allowing plaintiffs to turn to state-law remedies for FLSA violations 
conflicted with FLSA. According to the court, access to state remedies conflicted 
with FLSA because it would allow plaintiffs to “circumvent” FLSA’s compre-
hensive enforcement scheme.195 
As is elaborated below, Congress intended the enforcement of FLSA’s and 
Title VII’s protections to depend almost entirely on employee-initiated reports 
of abuse. Instead of wide-scale government-initiated inspections, as is common 
in other parts of the world, these laws largely rely on the initiative of employees 
to bring a lawsuit or agency complaint forward.196 The promotion of employee-
initiated complaints in each statute is inextricably tied to Congress’s policy goal 
of protecting the most subordinated and marginalized groups of workers for the 
good of the whole. Individual complainants serve as “private attorneys general” 
who enforce Title VII and FLSA on behalf of themselves and employees more 
 
194. Id. at 192 (quoting Kendall v. City of Chesapeake, 174 F.3d 437, 443 (4th Cir. 
1999)). 
195. Id. at 194; see also Gentry v. Home Depot, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17469, at *9 
(W.D. Mo. Mar. 13, 2007) (concluding that Title VII preempted plaintiff’s claim 
under a whistleblower law because allowing the claim would allow plaintiff to 
avoid “comprehensive statutory remedies” and would “excus[e] her failure to  
follow their administrative procedures”). 
196. For a discussion of the importance of private rights of action under Title VII and 
FLSA, see Kim, supra note 15. See also Jennifer Baugh, Punitive Damages and the 
Anti-retaliation Penalties Provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 89 Iowa L. 
Rev. 1717, 1724 (2004) (“[I]t is impractical to expect the Department of Labor, 
with its limited resources, to pursue action against every employer who violates 
the Act. That leaves the vindication of FLSA rights primarily in employees’ hands, 
which seems to be what Congress intended.”); Lisa M. Durham Taylor, Adding 
Subjective Fuel to the Vague-Standard Fire: A Proposal for Congressional Interven-
tion After Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 9 U. Pa. J. Lab. & 
Emp. L. 533, 601 (2007) (“The strict enforcement of Title VII necessary for main-
tenance of equality in the workplace depends heavily upon complaints by and in-
formation from employees, who come closer than most anyone else to witnessing 
employer conduct firsthand.”); Paul Frymer & John D. Skrentny, The Rise of  
Instrumental Affirmative Action: Law and the New Significance of Race in America, 
36 Conn. L. Rev. 677, 683 (2004) (“Title VII’s enforcement mechanisms were not 
self-executing. Individuals who believed they had suffered discrimination were to 
bring complaints to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.”); Angela 
P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race 
Law, 88 Calif. L. Rev. 1923, 1994 (2000) (referring to Title VII and Congress’s 
creation of “private rights of action to enforce the Act”); Samuel Herman, The 
Administration and Enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 Law & Con-
temp. Probs. 368, 385 (1939) (“The limited appropriations available to the Wage 
and Hour Division make it essential that adequate machinery for policing of the 
minimum standards be set up by the employees intended to be benefited.”). 
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broadly.197 In other words, an individual employee who brings his or her own 
complaint is vindicating a right as an individual employee, but is also serving as 
a mini-prosecutor on behalf of a broader public enforcement purpose.198 The 
 
197. See EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 602 (1981) (“The private 
right of action remains an important part of Title VII’s scheme of enforce-
ment. . . . Congress considered the charging party a ‘private attorney gener-
al’ . . . .”); Kim, supra note 15, at 307 (“[T]he legal norms and values promoted by 
undocumented workers in their suits against unscrupulous employers support 
conferring them with immigration status to enable them as private attorneys gen-
eral.”). In New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, the Supreme Court stated that 
“Congress has cast the Title VII plaintiff in the role of a ‘private attorney general,’ 
vindicating a policy of the highest priority.” 447 U.S. 54, 63 (1980); see also Michael 
J. Yelnosky, Filling an Enforcement Void: Using Testers To Uncover and Remedy 
Discrimination in Hiring for Lower-Skilled, Entry-Level Jobs, 26 U. Mich. J.L. 
Reform 403, 428 (1993) (“By permitting Title VII plaintiffs to act as private attor-
neys general vindicating an important public policy, Congress anticipated that 
these plaintiffs would represent the interests of individuals not before the court.”). 
Similarly, the Court explicitly referred to FLSA as a private right that is “granted 
in the public interest.” Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945). The 
Court concluded that, even when individual employees are informed and want to 
privately waive their right to minimum wages, overtime, or liquidated damages 
for work performed, the law forbids it in the interest of employees more generally. 
Id. at 706-07. Congress amended FLSA in 1947 to allow reductions in liquidated 
damages in some circumstances but still forbids private waivers. Liquidated  
damages, according to FLSA’s Portal-to-Portal Act amendments, can be reduced 
only when (1) a court or the DOL provides oversight, and (2) the employer shows 
that it acted in good faith and had reasonable grounds to believe it was acting in 
accordance with FLSA’s requirements. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 
216(c), 260 (2006). Subsequent to these amendments, the Supreme Court has 
cited Brooklyn Savings’s interpretation of FLSA’s underlying polices favorably and 
has explicitly reaffirmed its interpretation of FLSA’s role as a private right in the 
public interest. See, e.g., United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 206 n.4 (1995); 
Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 n.16 (1981). 
198. The importance of Title VII plaintiffs’ role as “private attorneys general” is  
frequently referred to in the legislative history. During the 1972 debates about Title 
VII amendments, the following statement was introduced into the record: “The 
courts have been particularly cognizant of the fact that claims under Title VII  
involve the vindication of a major public interest, and that any action under the 
Act involves considerations beyond those raised by the individual claimant.” 118 
Cong. Rec. 7168 (1972) (statement of Sen. Harrison A. Williams). During the 1991 
debates over Title VII amendments, Jane Lang, a former General Counsel of the 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, testified that: “The indi-
vidual Title VII litigant acts as a ‘private attorney general’ to vindicate the  
precious rights secured by that statute. It is in the interest of American society as a 
whole to assure that equality of opportunity in the workplace is not polluted by 
unlawful discrimination. Even the smallest victory advances that interest.” H.R. 
Rep. No. 102-40, at 46-47 (1991); see also id. at 65 (stating that certain remedies are 
“necessary to encourage citizens to act as private attorneys general to enforce the 
statute”). For a FLSA example, see 93 Cong. Rec. 2258 (1947), which notes Senator 
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analysis below will further elaborate Congress’s intent to preempt subfederal 
laws that serve as obstacles to employee-initiated complaints. It will then  
explore whether there is an unconstitutional conflict through a comparison of 
relevant aspects of IRCA and subfederal laws and an examination of the scho-
larship related to IRCA’s effect on employee-initiated complaints.  
 
1. FLSA’s and Title VII’s Encouragement of Employee-Initiated 
Complaints 
 
An in-depth examination of the legislative history, language, and case law 
involving both federal employment statutes demonstrates that Congress  
intended to preempt subfederal laws that discourage employees from coming 
forward with valid FLSA and Title VII complaints. Namely, with both statutes, 
Congress intended to encourage employee-initiated complaints and to discou-
rage employee fear of coming forward. The statutes’ reliance on employee-
initiated complaints is manifest. In 1938, eleven days before FLSA was signed  
into law, Representative Kent Keller, referring to “the enforcement of the act,” 
noted that it “puts directly into the hands of employees who are affected by  
violation the means and ability to assert and enforce their own rights, thus 
avoiding the assumption by Government of the sole responsibility to enforce 
the act.”199 Title VII’s legislative history similarly shows that Congress intended 
 
J. Howard McGrath’s statement: “The framers of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
believed that the possibility of employee suits would greatly help in obtaining 
general compliance.” 
199. 83 Cong. Rec. 9264 (1938). Moreover, during a debate over proposed amend-
ments to FLSA in 1946, Representative Michael Feighan stated: “[T]he employee-
suit provision” of FLSA “has undoubtedly had the effect of securing compliance 
without either Government action or court action.” 92 Cong. Rec. 5298 (1946). 
For an example of scholars who noted this soon after FLSA’s enactment, see Paul 
H. Douglas & Joseph Hackman, The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 II, 54 Pol. 
Sci. Q. 29, 54 (1939) (stating that FLSA’s private rights of action provision “prom-
ise[] to add to the effectiveness of the enforcement features of the act”). For more 
contemporary references, see Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resis-
tance Movements, 95 Calif. L. Rev. 1879, 1903 n.102 (2007) (citing a number of 
sources that demonstrate the importance of private rights of action and contend-
ing that agency enforcement alone is not enough); Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, 
Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement Through Partnerships with Workers’ 
Organizations, 38 Pol. & Soc’y 552, 553, 556 (2010) (referring to “complaint-driven 
investigations” as central to FLSA enforcement historically, and proposing a new 
“logic” of enforcement based on government partnerships with workers’ organi-
zations); and David Weil & Amanda Pyles, Why Complain? Complaints, Com-
pliance and the Problem of Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace, 27 Comp. Lab. 
L. & Pol’y J. 59, 66 (2005) (describing FLSA as reliant on complaints from work-
ers). See also Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 n.16 (1981)  
(acknowledging that FLSA was designed to “encourage employees to enforce their 
FLSA rights in court”). 
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to encourage private enforcement of Title VII’s antidiscrimination protec-
tions.200  
The language of both statutes also illustrates Congress’s manifest intent to 
encourage employee complaints. FLSA’s enforcement provision, section 216(b), 
facilitates employee-led enforcement in several ways. It allows private  
employees to initiate lawsuits on their own behalf without having to exhaust 
administrative remedies.201 It encourages employee-initiated complaints by  
requiring employers to pay the attorneys’ fees and costs of prevailing FLSA 
plaintiffs.202 Moreover, according to section 216(b), prevailing FLSA plaintiffs 
not only receive the unpaid minimum wages and overtime premiums that they 
should have received in the first place, but they also receive an equal amount in 
liquidated damages.203 Liquidated damages, sometimes referred to as “double 
damages,” provide an additional incentive for employees to come forward with 
their complaints. Unlike FLSA, Title VII does require employees to first make 
their complaints to a federal agency, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), and does not allow the federal agency to sue employers 
 
200. Legislative history related to Title VII’s 1972 amendments, for instance, “reflects a 
strong reaffirmation of the importance of the private right of action in the Title 
VII enforcement scheme.” EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 
602 n.21 (1981) (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 7565 (1972)); see also H.R. Rep. No. 102-
40, at 82 (1991) (referring to employee-initiated complaints as something “Con-
gress has relied upon for enforcement of the statute’s guarantees and advance-
ment of the public’s interest”). 
201. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006) (“An action to recover the liability prescribed in  
either of the preceding sentences may be maintained against any employer  
(including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdic-
tion by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and 
other employees similarly situated.”); see also Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, 
Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960) (“For weighty practical and other reasons, Congress 
did not seek to secure compliance with prescribed standards through continuing 
detailed federal supervision or inspection of payrolls. Rather it chose to rely on  
information and complaints received from employees seeking to vindicate rights 
claimed to have been denied.”). 
202. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“The court in such action shall, in addition to any judg-
ment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be 
paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.”). This purpose is evident in the 
Act’s legislative history as well: 
[Employees] themselves . . . [can] maintain an action in any court to  
recover the wages due them and in such a case the court shall allow  
liquidated damages in addition to the wages due equal to such deficient 
payment and shall also allow a reasonable attorney’s fees and assess the 
court costs against the violator of the law so that employees will not suf-
fer the burden of an expensive lawsuit. 
 83 Cong. Rec. 9264 (1938) (statement of Rep. Michael Feighan). 
203. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 
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in the absence of an employee complaint.204 However, like FLSA, Title VII  
permits an employee to bring a private suit in court once the EEOC has issued a 
right-to-sue letter.205 Also in line with FLSA, prevailing Title VII plaintiffs may 
receive attorneys’ fees and costs.206 Additionally, they can receive back pay,207 
compensatory damages, and, in some circumstances, punitive damages to  
remedy Title VII violations.208 
Congress not only explicitly encouraged employee-initiated complaints; it 
also tried to offset barriers to coming forward, such as employee fear. In other 
words, Congress acknowledged that, “[w]hen the costs outweigh the benefits, 
workers are less likely to enforce their rights.”209 This intention is perhaps best 
demonstrated by Congress’s inclusion of anti-retaliation provisions in both  
statutes. Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision protects an employee from retalia-
tion that occurs “because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful em-
ployment practice by [Title VII], or because he has made a charge, testified,  
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hear-
ing under [Title VII].”210 Title VII’s remedies, listed above, along with an  
employee’s reinstatement back into his or her job, are the potential conse-
quences for an employer who violates this provision. FLSA’s anti-retaliation 
provision makes it unlawful for any person “to discharge or in any other man-
ner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any 
complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or re-
lated to” FLSA.211 FLSA remedies for retaliation include reinstatement and 
 
204. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006). 
205. Id. § 2000e-5(f). 
206. Id. § 2000e-5(k). 
207. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(1), (k). 
208. Id. § 1981a(a)(1); see also H.R. Rep. No. 102-40, at 70 (1991) (referring to the  
increase in remedies as “enhanc[ing] the effectiveness of Title VII . . . by encour-
aging private enforcement”); H.R. Rep. No. 101-644, at 77 (1990) (referring to  
remedies and noting that “[t]hey promote the private enforcement of Title VII by 
providing incentives to discrimination victims to seek legal redress when their 
rights are infringed upon”); Christopher Ho & Jennifer C. Chang, Drawing the 
Line After Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Strategies for Protecting 
Undocumented Workers in the Title VII Context and Beyond, 22 Hofstra Lab. & 
Emp. L.J. 473, 513 (2005) (“[B]ackpay in the Title VII setting also plays a crucial 
role in encouraging private individuals to come forward and enforce the public 
interest in freedom from discrimination, over and above any private interests of 
the complainants.”). 
209. Andrew C. Brunsden, Hybrid Class Actions, Dual Certification, and Wage Law 
Enforcement in the Federal Courts, 29 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 269, 272 (2008). 
210. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
211. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006). 
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compensatory damages. In some federal circuit courts of appeals, punitive 
damages are an additional available remedy in FLSA retaliation cases.212 
In the retaliation context, the Supreme Court’s decision in Mitchell v.  
Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc. confirms Congress’s intent to offset employee fear 
of coming forward with FLSA complaints. The Mitchell Court considered 
whether lost wages were available to remedy an employer’s violation of FLSA’s  
anti-retaliation provision in cases brought by the U.S. Secretary of Labor. In 
coming to the conclusion that FLSA’s unpaid wages remedy was available, the 
Court reasoned that Congress intended FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision to  
reduce barriers to employee-initiated complaints. The Court stated that “effec-
tive enforcement could . . . only be expected if employees felt free to approach 
officials with their grievances.”213  
A number of Supreme Court cases in the Title VII retaliation context also 
demonstrate Congress’s policy goal of ensuring that employees are not unrea-
sonably deterred from, or made fearful of, coming forward with complaints.214 
In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, the Court stated that 
“Title VII depends for its enforcement upon the cooperation of employees who 
 
212. See id. § 216(b); Travis v. Gary Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 921 F.2d 108, 112 
(7th Cir. 1990) (concluding that punitive damages were available). But see Snapp 
v. Unlimited Concepts, Inc., 208 F.3d 928, 933-39 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding that 
punitive damages were unavailable). 
213. Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960) (emphasis  
added). Federal courts of appeals have largely followed this interpretation of the 
intentions behind FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision. See, e.g., Valerio v. Putnam 
Assocs. Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 43 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating that the purpose of the anti-
retaliation provision is to “prevent[] employees’ attempts to secure their rights 
under the Act from taking on the character of ‘a calculated risk.’ Such circums-
tances would fail to ‘foster a climate in which compliance with the substantive 
provisions of the Act would be enhanced’” (citation omitted) (quoting Mitchell, 
361 U.S. at 292, 293)); EEOC v. White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 
1989) (“The anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA was designed to prevent fear of 
economic retaliation . . . .”); Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 124 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(“[T]he Court has made clear that the key to interpreting the [FLSA’s] anti-
retaliation provision is the need to prevent employees’ ‘fear of economic retalia-
tion’ for voicing grievances about substandard conditions.”). 
214. Federal circuit courts of appeals consistently follow this view of Title VII. See e.g., 
Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 204 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing the need to protect 
employee complainants); Heuer v. Weil-McLain, 203 F.3d 1021, 1023 (7th Cir. 
2000) (referring to the importance of not deterring employee-initiated Title VII 
complaints); Sweeney v. West, 149 F.3d 550, 556 (7th Cir. 1998) (“The undoubted 
purpose of Title VII’s prohibition against retaliation is to prevent employers from 
discouraging complaints or otherwise chilling the exercise of an employee’s 
rights.”); Learned v. City of Bellevue, 860 F.2d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that 
if Title VII employee complainants were not protected, “‘resort to the remedies 
provided by the Act would be severely chilled’” (quoting Sias v. City of Demon-
stration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978))). 
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are willing to file complaints and act as witnesses.”215 It relied on this aspect of 
Title VII to conclude that courts should not narrowly interpret what constitutes 
an employer’s adverse employment action against an employee in the retalia-
tion context.216 In Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., the Court considered whether Title 
VII’s anti-retaliation provision covered adverse employment actions that an 
employer took against employees who no longer worked at a particular  
establishment.217 The Court concluded that Title VII does protect former  
employees from post-employment retaliation that takes place due to Title VII 
complaints.218 In coming to this determination, the Court reasoned that exclud-
ing former employees from this protection would “deter victims of discrimina-
tion from complaining to the EEOC, and would provide a perverse incentive for 
employers to fire employees who might bring Title VII claims.”219 Deterring 
employees from bringing complaints, the Court reasoned, would be inconsis-
tent with Title VII’s purposes.220  
The legislative history of both statutes also shows congressional intent to 
offset barriers to employee-led complaints, including employee fear. In the Title 
VII context, Senator Hubert Humphrey remarked in 1964 that Congress’s goal 
was to “make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a meritorious 
suit.”221 In opposition to a proposed shortening of FLSA’s statute of limitations 
for employee complaints under FLSA in 1946, Senator James Murray intro-
duced a letter from the Secretary of Labor, which contended that “to place  
unreasonable difficulties in the way of bringing employee suits would increase 
both the burden and expense of enforcement of the act by the Federal Govern-
ment.”222 The Secretary’s letter also acknowledged the importance of reducing 
employee fear of coming forward with complaints. It stated that, because of 
“unequal bargaining power between unorganized employees and their employ-
ers,” employees “may, and often do, fear to bring suit while they are still  
employed, because of the possibility of losing their jobs.”223 Scholars confirm 
Congress’s intent to reduce fear among employees so that they are willing to 
come forward with FLSA and Title VII claims. As one scholar contends, federal 
employment statutes “would collapse in the absence of protections for com-
 
215. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006) (emphasis add-
ed). 
216. Id. at 60-67. 
217. 519 U.S. 337 (1997). 
218. Id. at 346. 
219. Id. (emphasis added). 
220. Id. at 345-46. 
221. N.Y. Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 63 (1980) (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 
12,724 (1964)). 
222. 92 Cong. Rec. 3187 (1946). 
223. Id. 
Article - Griffith - 18 - Final - 2011.05.25 6/17/2011  3:14 PM 
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW 29 : 389 2011 
436 
plaining employees.”224 Moreover, many have noted that “Title VII’s ability to 
realize its potential depends . . . on the willingness of victims of workplace  
discrimination to bring that discrimination to light.”225  
 
2. Subfederal Employer-Sanctions Laws’ Discouragement of  
Employee-Initiated Complaints 
 
Subfederal employer-sanctions laws present formidable barriers to the  
employee-led complaint schemes of Title VII and FLSA. As compared to IRCA, 
these subfederal laws do not ameliorate their impact on federal workplace  
protections for employees in any way. Instead, they intensify fear among immi-
grant workers and facilitate coworker harassment. The qualitative differences 
between IRCA and the subfederal laws, along with research on IRCA’s effects on  
employee-initiated workplace law complaints, demonstrate why there is a  
conflict between the subfederal laws, on the one hand, and FLSA and Title VII, 
on the other. Despite having a provision to offset its impact on FLSA, relying 
much less heavily on citizen complaints for enforcement, and permitting no 
private causes of action, IRCA is already in considerable tension with FLSA’s 
and Title VII’s employee-led enforcement schemes. 
Unlike these subfederal laws, Congress acknowledged (although insuffi-
ciently in my view226) potentially negative effects of IRCA’s workplace immigra-
 
224. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 140, at 46; see also Jennifer Clemons, FLSA Re-
taliation: A Continuum of Employee Protection, 53 Baylor L. Rev. 535, 538 (2001) 
(“[T]he purpose of these substantive obligations would not be realized if  
employees are unable to exercise their rights due to fear of their employer’s retali-
ation.”). 
225. See Brianne J. Gorod, Rejecting “Reasonableness”: A New Look at Title VII’s Anti-
Retaliation Provision, 56 Am. U. L. Rev. 1469, 1478 (2007); see also Lorrie E. Brad-
ley, Striking Back Against Retaliatory Discrimination: How Burlington Northern & 
Santa Fe Railway Company v. White Expands Protections for Employees Under Title 
VII’s Participation and Opposition Clauses, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 1224, 1229 (2007) (not-
ing that Title VII enforcement depends on employee complaints); Christopher M. 
Courts, An Adverse Employment Action—Not Just an Unfriendly Place To Work: 
Co-Worker Retaliatory Harassment Under Title VII, 87 Iowa L. Rev. 235, 238-39 
(2001) (noting that “[t]he EEOC relies on such complaints to perform its  
enforcement duties”); Alex B. Long, Retaliatory Discharge and the Ethical Rules 
Governing Attorneys, 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1043, 1086-87 (2008) (arguing that a lack 
of employee complaints would chill Title VII enforcement); Michael S. Vogel, The 
Remains of Title VII After Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 22 Colum. Hum. Rts. 
L. Rev. 73, 82 (1990) (“The willingness of individuals to bring complaints is an  
essential element of Title VII.”). 
226. At least one federal immigration reform policy proposal has addressed the need to 
further protect immigrants who report employment law violations. See Amber 
McKinney, Menendez Introduces Senate Bill To Protect Immigrants Who Report  
Labor Law Violations, Daily Lab. Rep., Apr. 15, 2010, at A-17 (reporting on a “bill 
designed to provide enhance[d] labor protections to immigrant workers and deter 
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tion enforcement measures on FLSA’s enforcement scheme. IRCA contains a 
provision that appropriates money to the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) to 
reduce FLSA wage-and-hour violations against undocumented employees. 
IRCA’s section 111(d) states the following: 
There are authorized to be appropriated . . . such sums as may be  
necessary to the Department of Labor for enforcement activities of the 
Wage and Hour Division . . . in order to deter the employment of  
unauthorized aliens and remove the economic incentive for employers 
to exploit and use such aliens.227 
Despite this appropriation, IRCA is in evident tension with FLSA’s and 
Title VII’s promotion of employee-initiated complaints. While there is little  
systematic empirical investigation of this issue to date, scholars and worker  
advocates have extensively noted that IRCA reduces the likelihood that nonciti-
zen immigrant employees will initiate complaints against their employers.228 As 
Professor Michael Wishnie remarks, federal employer sanctions “have deterred 
immigrants from communicating with labor and employment agencies about 
 
employers from using immigration laws to prevent employees from reporting 
workplace abuses”). 
227. Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 § 111(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 
(2006). 
228. E.g., Nat’l Emp’t Law Project, ICED OUT: How Immigration  
Enforcement Has Interfered with Workers’ Rights 5 (2009), available at 
http://nelp.3cdn.net/75a43e6ae48f67216a_w2m6bp1ak.pdf (“The single-minded  
focus on immigration enforcement without regard to violations of workplace laws 
has enabled employers with rampant labor and employment violations to profit 
by employing workers who are terrified to complain about substandard wages, 
unsafe conditions, and lack of benefits.”); Fine & Gordon, supra note 199, at 555 
(stating that “immigrants [are] increasingly unwilling to come forward to report 
wage violations” because of “work site raids and employer sanctions enforce-
ment”); Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of 
Labor Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 345, 360 
(2001) (noting that immigration enforcement during labor disputes “creat[es] an 
unemployed underclass within our borders . . . . The unemployed, non-deported, 
discharged workers remain a part of our society, and are pushed further under-
ground, where they are that much more vulnerable to exploitation by unscrupul-
ous employers seeking to circumvent labor laws”); Catherine K. Ruckelshaus,  
Labor’s Wage War, 35 Fordham Urb. L.J. 373, 385 (2008) (“When workers fear 
coming forward to complain of unpaid wages, it chills enforcement of the wage 
laws and financially rewards employers who illegally underpay their employees.”); 
Leticia M. Saucedo, Immigration Enforcement Versus Employment Law Enforce-
ment: The Case for Integrated Protections in the Immigrant Workplace, 38 Fordham 
Urb. L.J. 303, 325 (2010) (“The consequence of decades of worksite and employer-
focused immigration enforcement has been the continued erosion of workplace 
rights for noncitizen workers.”). 
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unlawful activity they have suffered or witnessed.”229 Similarly, as Professor 
Jennifer Gordon contends, employer “sanctions rendered undocumented  
immigrants more vulnerable, less likely to report violations of minimum wage 
and other workplace standards, cheaper, and increasingly resistant to [union] 
organizing efforts.”230  
 There is some evidence that noncitizen employees do, in fact, underreport 
workplace law violations.231 Underreporting occurs, at least in part, because of 
employee fear of coming forward. One study, for instance, showed that sixty-
two percent of undocumented workers who acknowledged not reporting a safe-
ty violation explained their choice as due to their “fear of employer retaliation 
or to the fear of deportation.”232 It is not a surprise that IRCA’s workplace-based 
immigration enforcement scheme would make undocumented workers fearful. 
The “growing anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that many employers 
report workers in retaliation for unauthorized immigrants’ attempting to assert 
 
229. Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The 
Experiment Fails, 2007 U. Chi. Legal F. 193, 213 [hereinafter Wishnie, Prohibit-
ing]; see also Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating 
that “most undocumented workers are reluctant to report abusive or discrimina-
tory employment practices”); Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right To  
Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 667, 667-80 (2003) [hereinafter Wishnie, Immigrants]; 
Wishnie, Prohibiting, supra, at 213 (contending that IRCA and Hoffman “have  
deterred immigrants from communicating with labor and employment agencies 
about unlawful activity they have suffered or witnessed”). 
230. Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. 503, 540 
(2007). Gordon further argues that sanctions “increased the appeal of undocu-
mented workers to unscrupulous employers and gave employers a way to derail 
organizing campaigns in immigrant-heavy workplaces.” Id. 
231. See Wishnie, Immigrants, supra note 229, at 676-80 nn.51-61 (reporting some em-
pirical evidence). Deterrence is an important aspect of both FLSA and Title VII. 
FLSA’s legislative history from 1947 illustrates this well. As Senator Olin Johnston 
remarked in 1947 debates over FLSA amendments, “Although substantial sums 
have been regained by workers through the exercise of their rights under [FLSA 
216(b)], they are of minor importance compared with its indirect influence on 
employers.” 93 Cong. Rec. 2372 (1947). 
232. Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the Workplace, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 
1103, 1123 (2009) (describing a Center for Urban Economic Development study, 
which was based on a survey of 1131 documented and undocumented workers in 
Chicago). Officials from the DOL’s Wage and Hour Division have also “expressed 
concerns that foreign born workers, although generally protected by FLSA to the 
same extent as other workers, may be less likely than others to complain because 
they may be unaware of federal laws or fear deportation if they are undocu-
mented.” U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO/GGD-90-62, Fair Labor 
Standards Act: Better Use of Available Resources and Consistent Re-
porting Could Improve Compliance 3-4 (2008). 
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their labor and employment rights.”233 Moreover, “even if an employer never 
calls in federal immigration authorities,” IRCA still increases fear among undo-
cumented workers because the “constant threat can make workers’ lives preca-
rious—always reminding them that they are powerless.”234  
Courts have even acknowledged that IRCA can provoke employee fear and 
thus can have negative consequences on employee-led enforcement schemes. 
These courts often address this issue when confronted with an argument that 
IRCA, as interpreted by the Hoffman Court, requires discovery into immigra-
tion status during an employment law dispute.235 The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, for instance, stated the following when it refused discovery 
into immigration status during a Title VII case:  
While documented workers face the possibility of retaliatory discharge 
for an assertion of their labor and civil rights, undocumented workers 
confront the harsher reality that, in addition to possible discharge, their 
employer will likely report them to the [immigration authorities] and 
 
233. Lee, supra note 232, at 1107. To address the “asymmetrical” relationship between 
employers and employees that IRCA creates, Professor Lee proposes sanctions for 
employers who make immigration complaints in response to employee 
workplace-law complaints. See id. at 1141. 
234. Motomura, supra note 47, at 2069; see also id. (“F. Ray Marshall, Secretary of  
Labor in the Carter Adminstration, once said that immigrants who come outside 
the law work ‘scared and hard.’”). Even though employer-sanctions laws focus on 
employer liability on their face, workers more often feel the brunt of enforcement. 
See Lee, supra note 232, at 1107 (describing employers as having “de facto immuni-
ty from sanctions”). Similarly, workplace raids under Arizona’s employer-
sanctions law, in effect since January 1, 2008, have led to a number of arrests of 
undocumented workers but very little employer liability. See Michael Kiefer, Rom-
ley Bucks Party Line, Challenges SB 1070 Flaws, Ariz. Republic, July 24, 2010, at B1 
(“[D]espite 36 raids in the name of enforcing employer sanctions, there was only 
one successful prosecution [of an employer].”); Jim Small, Arizona’s New Employ-
er Sanctions Law Coming up Short, Ariz. Capitol Times, Oct. 12, 2009, 
http://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2009/10/12/employer-sanctions-coming-up 
-short/ (“Although 310 employees have been arrested for identity theft and fake 
identifications, none of those businesses faced punishment under the state law.”). 
235. See, e.g., Flores v. Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d 462, 465 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (refusing 
discovery into immigration status and stating that “if forced to disclose their  
immigration status, most undocumented aliens would withdraw their claims or 
refrain from bringing an action such as this in the first instance . . . [which] would 
effectively eliminate the FLSA as a means for protecting undocumented workers 
from exploitation and retaliation”); Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan Int’l, Inc., 207 F. 
Supp. 2d 191, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (refusing discovery into plaintiffs’ immigration 
status because it could “inhibit plaintiffs in pursuing their rights”). 
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they will be subjected to deportation proceedings or criminal prosecu-
tion. . . . The case law substantiates these fears.236  
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that immigration inquiries during 
workplace disputes even foster fear among documented immigrant workers. 
Documented immigrant workers, according to the court, “may fear that their 
immigration status would be changed, or that their status would reveal the  
immigration problems of their family or friends.”237 
Once again, IRCA’s track record is illuminating to the analysis. It illustrates 
that subfederal employer-sanctions laws that do not share IRCA’s DOL appro-
priation are likely to pose barriers to FLSA’s enforcement scheme. In contrast to 
IRCA, none of the subfederal employer-sanctions laws discussed in this Article 
contain anything even arguably similar to IRCA’s provision to allocate funds to 
the DOL for greater enforcement of employment laws on behalf of undocu-
mented employees.  
Additionally, IRCA’s track record shows that the complaint and investiga-
tion procedures of some subfederal employer-sanctions laws pose obstacles to 
FLSA’s and Title VII’s enforcement schemes. As described above, IRCA does 
not initiate an investigation following every complaint, nor does it give  
employees a private cause of action.238 The laws in Arizona, Hazleton, and Val-
ley Park, however, each call for the initiation of an investigation into a potential  
violation of the subfederal employer-sanctions law once a resident of the juris-
diction makes a complaint.239 We saw an example of such a loose basis for in-
itiating an investigation when Arizona officials raided a McDonald’s restaurant 
in March 2010. They arrested twenty-one allegedly undocumented workers after 
they “were tipped off . . . by a caller.”240 Moreover, Oklahoma’s law and Hazle-
 
236. Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing cases in which 
employers reported undocumented workers who made labor-rights claims to 
immigration authorities). 
237. Id. at 1065. 
238. See Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 § 101(e)(8), 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1324a(e)(9) (2006). 
239. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-212(B) (Supp. 2010); Valley Park, Mo., Ordinance 
1722, § 4B(1) (Feb. 14, 2007); Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, § 4(B)(1) (Sept. 8, 
2006). Some Arizona counties heighten the standards for making complaints. See 
Brady McCombs, Cochise Will Field Anonymous Complaints, Ariz. Daily Star, 
Jan. 6, 2008, http://azstarnet.com/news/local/border/article_8dfff692-6dc1-5cf4-
9d0f-69cf131f0595.html (reporting that law enforcement agencies in some  
southeastern Arizona counties “require that people accusing businesses of  
employing unauthorized workers submit a written complaint in person and sign 
it under oath before a notary public”). 
240. Immigration Raids Nab 21 at Phoenix-Area McDonalds, Ariz. Daily Star, Mar. 
27, 2010, http://azstarnet.com/news/state-and-regional/article_402d05b0-a38a-
5d8d-9eed-5bb280eb9859.html. 
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ton’s law allow employees who feel that undocumented employees have nega-
tively affected them to bring private suits against their employers.241  
Such “lax” complaint and investigation procedures of subfederal employer-
sanctions laws242 are likely to heighten the fear of immigration enforcement in 
the workplace and coworker harassment beyond the fear that IRCA already 
stokes. This heightened fear makes it even less likely that immigrant workers 
will come forward when they experience a FLSA violation or when they are  
harassed by a supervisor or coworker because of their sex, religion, ethnicity, 
race, or national origin.243 Furthermore, the complaint and investigation proce-
dures that go beyond IRCA also create new opportunities for retaliation against 
employees who make FLSA or Title VII complaints. A coworker or supervisor, 
for instance, who is accused (or fears being accused) of sex discrimination 
against an allegedly undocumented employee may threaten to make a com-
plaint or bring a private suit under the subfederal employer-sanctions law if the 
undocumented employee does not withdraw his or her Title VII claim.  
As Part III illustrated, altering the analytical lens to focus the preemption 
analysis on federal employment law, rather than federal immigration law,  
reveals that federal law does preempt subfederal employer-sanctions laws.  
 
IV. Federal Immployment Law’s Preemptive Effects  
 
This Article’s main contention, presented in Part III, is that two federal 
employment statutes (FLSA and Title VII) independently preempt the four  
subfederal employer-sanctions laws and other subfederal laws that mirror their 
provisions. The analysis thus far, however, also reveals the need to advance hy-
brid preemption frameworks that integrate two areas of federal concern: immi-
gration law and employment law. As Part II discussed, subfederal employer-
sanctions laws are a hybrid form of law. While their primary intent is to deter 
illegal immigration, they do so by regulating the workplace. This Part develops 
 
241. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 25, § 1313(C) (West 2008); Hazelton, Pa., Ordinance 
2006-18, § 4(E)(2) (Sept. 8, 2006). 
242. See Ndulo, supra note 164, at 877 (referring to Arizona’s law as including “lax  
requirements . . . for filing complaints”). 
243. See Saucedo, supra note 140, at 903 (“Recent state and local enforcement ordin-
ances, such as the one enacted in Hazleton, Pennsylvania, further increase the  
anxiety of immigrant communities.”). Even before the heightened fear due to 
subfederal employer-sanctions laws, potential plaintiffs were hesitant to complain. 
See Philip L. Bartlett II, Disparate Treatment: How Income Can Affect the Level of 
Employer Compliance with Employment Statutes, 5 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 
419, 449 n.129 (2002) (contending that FLSA plaintiffs may be reluctant to  
complain); Gorod, supra note 225, at 1478-82 (“One study found that ‘more than 
one-third of those who reported unfair treatment took no further action, and only 
3% reported suing their employer.’” (quoting Laura Beth Nielsen & Aaron Beim, 
Media Misrepresentation: Title VII, Print Media, and Public Perceptions of Discrim-
ination Litigation, 15 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 237, 241 (2004))). 
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an immployment preemption theory. Specifically, it proposes that these four 
subfederal employer-sanctions laws conflict with Congress’s intent to consider 
and promote federal employment policy goals as part of IRCA.  
In other words, IRCA may conflict with subfederal employer-sanctions 
laws because IRCA incorporates the very federal employment policy goals 
shown in Part III to be in conflict with these subfederal laws. IRCA “balances 
specifically chosen measures discouraging illegal employment with measures to 
protect those who might be adversely affected.”244 Courts and scholars have 
noted that legislators did not intend for employer sanctions “to undermine or 
diminish in any way labor protections in existing law.”245 And, as IRCA’s legis-
lative history and plain language will demonstrate, legislators did intend for 
IRCA to promote its own employment policy goals. While this proposed 
preemption theory focuses on IRCA’s preemptive effects, it is unlike other 
IRCA preemption theories because it places a more comprehensive spotlight on 
IRCA’s integration of employment policy goals. It is for this reason that this  
Article refers to this theory as an immployment-law preemption theory. 
Legislators folded FLSA policy concerns into the scope of IRCA. They  
acknowledged, for example, that employers have an incentive to employ undo-
cumented workers because of these workers’ “willingness to accept substandard 
wages and working conditions.”246 As a result, during the fifteen years that 
Congress considered proposed federal employer-sanctions provisions, many 
called for “[v]igorous and effective enforcement of” FLSA.247 This recommen-
dation included proposed “increases in budget, equipment and personnel that 
[would] allow the Employment Standards Administration of the Department of 
Labor [using FLSA and other labor laws] to increase its efforts to monitor the 
 
244. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 767 (10th 
Cir. 2010) (quoting Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc. v. INS, 913 F.2d 1350, 
1366 (9th Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 502 U.S. 183 (1991)); see also Wishnie, 
Prohibiting, supra note 229, at 198-205 (discussing the debate involving various 
competing interests that preceded IRCA’s enactment in 1986). 
245. H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, at 58 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5662; see 
also Wishnie, supra note 140, at 517 n.103 (citing other aspects of the legislative  
history that express this sentiment). 
246. S. Rep. No. 97-485, at 120 (1982). 
247. Id.; see also Immigration Control and Legalization Amendments: Hearing on H.R. 
3080 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and Int’l Law of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 129 (1986) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of 
Mr. Arthur Fleming) (stating that “[v]igorous enforcement of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act and other labor laws” was essential to immigration reform); Staff 
of H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., U.S. Immigration Policy and 
the National Interest 70 (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter National Inter-
est] (recommending increased enforcement of workplace legislation). 
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workplace.”248 To respond to some of these FLSA concerns, legislators proposed 
an appropriation to the DOL as part of immigration reform.249 Congress even-
tually passed IRCA with the appropriation to the DOL intact, giving federal au-
thorities more power to combat employers’ failure to follow FLSA standards 
regarding undocumented workers. In these ways, IRCA’s legislative history and 
plain language delineate IRCA’s employment policy goals.  
Legislators also incorporated Title VII policy concerns into IRCA. During 
their lengthy consideration of IRCA, legislators frequently and extensively  
discussed the need for antidiscrimination protections in IRCA.250 As early as 
1973, for instance, some legislators were concerned that IRCA “would be highly 
discriminatory against Mexican-Americans and against aliens from Mexico and 
other countries who are legally entitled to work because, rather than risking  
violation of a Federal criminal law, employers would refuse to hire anyone with 
a foreign accent or a Spanish surname.”251 As Representative Edward Roybal put 
it in 1986, some employers “will just not interview anyone who may appear to 
be Hispanic and quite obviously Asian. That will result in discrimination. Silent 
perhaps, but damaging just as well.”252 Thus, many legislators felt that, even 
though Title VII had ameliorated employment discrimination, an employer-
sanctions law would “re-create a civil rights issue.”253 
As a response to some of these Title VII-like employment-discrimination 
concerns, legislators proposed a number of protections that eventually became 
 
248. National Interest, supra note 247, at 70; see also S. Rep. No. 97-485, supra note 
246, at 120 (“I propose authorizing additional funds to support enforcement  
efforts [for FLSA and other laws] while employer sanctions are implemented.”). 
249. See S. Rep. No. 99-132, at 29 (1985) (“Subsection (d) authorizes the appropriation 
to the Department of Labor of additional sums as may be necessary for enforce-
ment activities of the Wage and Hour Division and the Office of Federal Contract 
Compliance Programs.”). 
250. See, e.g., id. at 109 (“The problem of discrimination resulting from employer sanc-
tions against ‘foreign-looking’ or ‘foreign-sounding’ individuals is a reality which 
no Member of Congress should ignore.”); S. Rep. No. 98-62, at 11 (1983) (“Con-
cern has been expressed that the employer sanctions program will be used as an 
excuse by employers who want to avoid hiring certain persons because of their 
race or national origin.”); H.R. Rep. No. 94-506, at 15 (1975) (“It has been  
suggested that this legislation would cause employers to discriminate on the basis 
of national origin.”); 132 Cong. Rec. 31,635 (1986) (statement of Rep. Edwards) 
(“In my view, Mr. Speaker, [IRCA] is an invitation to racial discrimination.”). 
251. Staff of H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., Illegal Aliens, A Review 
of Hearings Conducted During the 92d Congress by Subcomm. No. 1, at 25 
(Comm. Print 1973). 
252. 132 Cong. Rec. 29,994 (1986); see also id. (“The truth of the matter is that thou-
sands and thousands of Hispanics in this country and Asians as well will suffer the 
consequences of discrimination simply because of sanctions.”). 
253. 132 Cong. Rec. 31,640 (1986). 
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law. In fact, IRCA’s employment-discrimination policy goals go beyond Title 
VII in several ways. Unlike Title VII, IRCA covers workplaces with fewer than 
fifteen employees254 and protects employees who are legally entitled to work in 
the U.S. from citizenship-status discrimination.255 As one legislator observed, 
“[a]ntidiscrimination legislation of this nature is unprecedented in that it is 
based upon anticipated discrimination, rather than an historical pattern of past 
discrimination.”256 Similarly, another legislator stated, “The bill broadens the 
Title VII protections against national origin discrimination, while not broaden-
ing the other Title VII protections, because of the concern of some Members 
that people of ‘foreign’ appearance might be made more vulnerable by the  
imposition of sanctions.”257 
There was so much overlap between Title VII’s goals and IRCA’s proposed 
antidiscrimination protections that legislators debated extensively whether it 
would be best to simply amend Title VII to respond to the new forms of  
discrimination that IRCA indirectly encouraged.258 Others felt that the new fed-
eral antidiscrimination enforcement agency created by IRCA would be a “dup-
licative bureaucracy” because of the existence of the EEOC.259 Ultimately, of 
course, Congress did not amend Title VII and instead included antidiscrimina-
tion protections and a new enforcement agency as part of IRCA itself. The  
debate, however, shows Congress’s extensive consideration of employment-
discrimination policy as part of immigration reform.260 
 
254. IRCA covers workplaces with four or more employees. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(2)(A) 
(2006). 
255. See id. § 1324b(a)(1)(B); see also 132 Cong. Rec. 33,223 (1986) (“The bill broadens 
the title VII protections of the Civil Rights Act to include national origin as well as 
citizenship. I believe this further protects against possible abuse.”); 132 Cong. Rec. 
33,242 (1986) (“This bill further expands the civil rights provisions of title VII, first 
by adding the concept of a citizenship category, and second, by extending the  
coverage of title VII from employers and entities of 15 or more persons to employ-
ers and entities of 4 or more persons.”). 
256. 132 Cong. Rec. 31,632 (1986); see also id. (“I believe this can be viewed as one of 
the most far-reaching and important civil rights provisions in recent history.”). 
257. 132 Cong. Rec. 30,905 (1986). 
258. See Hearing, supra note 247, at 231-33 (1986). 
259. H.R. Rep. No. 94-506, at 15 (1975). 
260. Legislators also drafted IRCA to avoid conflicts between the new Special Counsel 
for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices in the Department of  
Justice and the EEOC. IRCA, for instance, states that an employee cannot file an 
IRCA discrimination complaint “if a charge with respect to that practice based on 
the same set of facts has been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission under [Title VII], unless the charge is dismissed as being outside the 
scope of such title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(b)(2). 
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Federal agency actions are consistent with the view that IRCA incorporates 
federal employment policy considerations.261 A recent example of these consid-
erations is the “Comprehensive Worksite Enforcement Strategy” of the United 
States Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE). ICE’s website 
states that the federal government’s workplace-based enforcement strategy 
“promotes national security, protects critical infrastructure and targets employ-
ers who violate employment laws or engage in abuse or exploitation of workers.”262 
It goes on to assert that, along with other things, “ICE will look for evidence of 
the mistreatment of workers.”263  
Moreover, a March 31, 2011, Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) be-
tween ICE and the DOL264 exhibits the federal government’s consideration of 
federal employment policy goals during IRCA enforcement actions. Two of the 
purposes of the 2011 MOU between immigration and labor authorities are “to 
ensure that their respective civil worksite enforcement activities do not conflict” 
and “to create a means to exchange information to foster enforcement against 
abusive employment practices directed against workers regardless of status.”265 
According to the 2011 MOU, which follows its 1998 predecessor in some 
ways,266 federal immigration authorities will not engage in workplace-based  
 
261. Cf. Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 737, 788 
(2004) (noting that “we might reasonably suppose agencies to possess significant 
expertise” because of the “technical and practical questions” that implied obstacle 
preemption implicates). 
262. Worksite Enforcement, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement, http://www.ice 
.gov/worksite/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2011) (emphasis added). 
263. Id. For an argument that this policy does not help workers in practice, see David 
Bacon & Bill Ong Hing, The Rise and Fall of Employer Sanctions, 38 Fordham 
Urb. L.J. 77 (2010). 
264. The agreement is between the Department of Homeland Security and the  
DOL. The “principal components” are ICE as well as DOL’s Wage and Hour Divi-
sion, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, and the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration. See Revised Memorandum of Understanding 
Between the Departments of Homeland Security and Labor Concerning Enforce-
ment Activities at Worksites (Mar. 31, 2011) [hereinafter Revised Memorandum], 
available at http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/reports/HispanicLaborForce/DHS 
-DOL-MOU.pdf. 
265. Id. at 1, 3. 
266. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Immigration and Nationaliza-
tion Service, Department of Justice, and the Employment Standards Administra-
tion, Department of Labor (Nov. 23, 1998), available at http://www.nilc.org/ 
immsemplymnt/emprights/MOU.pdf (last visited May 25, 2011) (“The agencies 
will develop and implement policies . . . that avoid inappropriate worksite inter-
ventions where it is known or reasonably suspected that a labor dispute is occur-
ring and the intervention may, or may be sought so as to, interfere in the dispute 
matter.”). 
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enforcement if the DOL is simultaneously investigating a labor dispute at that 
workplace, unless there are exceptional circumstances.267 As part of this effort, 
immigration authorities will continue to be vigilant about whether the “tips and 
leads it receives . . . are motivated by an improper desire to manipulate a pend-
ing labor dispute, retaliate against employees for exercising labor rights, or  
otherwise frustrate the enforcement of labor laws.”268 Acknowledging employ-
ment policy concerns, immigration authorities also agreed to ensure that the 
DOL has an opportunity to interview undocumented workers who are detained 
during ICE’s enforcement actions about potential employment-law viola-
tions.269  
To deal with ongoing issues related to the overlap between immigration en-
forcement and employment policy, the 2011 MOU calls for the establishment of 
“a joint Worksite Enforcement Coordination Committee,” which will meet 
quarterly “to review the implementation of this MOU, resolve any disputes, 
work in partnership as cases arise, and deconflict civil enforcement activities.”270 
This interagency cooperation follows through on a recommendation put forth 
during Congress’s consideration of IRCA that the federal immigration agency 
and the Wage and Hour Division of the DOL have “greater cooperation and 
coordination.”271 
It is too early to determine the impact of the 2011 MOU, but in the past, 
federal immigration authorities have sometimes coordinated with the federal 
 
267. See Revised Memorandum, supra note 264, at 2. Similarly, per the 1998 MOU, the 
DOL “will not report the undocumented status of workers if discovered during an 
investigation of a labor dispute triggered by an employee complaint, nor will it 
inquire into a worker’s immigration status while conducting a complaint-driven 
investigation.” Rebecca Smith & Catherine Ruckelshaus, Solutions, Not Scapegoats: 
Abating Sweatshop Conditions for All Low-Wage Workers as a Centerpiece of Immi-
gration Reform, 10 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 555, 591-92 (2007) (citing the 1998 
MOU). 
268. Revised Memorandum, supra note 264, at 2. This is important, in part, because 
some employers report their workers to immigration authorities in retaliation  
for labor- and employment-law complaints. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 232, at 1120 
(noting that “the existing empirical—and growing anecdotal—evidence all points 
to the same conclusion: within industries traditionally dependent on immigrant 
labor, employers report the presence of unauthorized workers as a way of escap-
ing liability for labor- and employment-related workplace violations”); id. at 1120-
23 (describing anecdotal and empirical evidence related to that statement). 
269. Revised Memorandum, supra note 264, at 3. 
270. Id. 
271. H.R. Rep. No. 92-1366, at 5 (1972); see H.R. Rep. No. 94-506, at 10-11 (1975) (fol-
lowing up on the need to increase coordination among the DOL, the INS, the  
Social Security Administration, and the IRS). 
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agencies in charge of FLSA and Title VII enforcement before taking action.272 
Similarly, federal immigration authorities have sometimes followed the 1998 
MOU’s directives to stay out of labor disputes.273 At least one scholar has  
referred to federal immigration enforcement as an “unlikely” response “to re-
ports of undocumented workers in cases where [immigration authorities have] 
reason to believe labor disputes are in progress.”274 Some acknowledge that 
worker “advocates have had some success using this guidance to convince [fed-
eral immigration] officials to refrain from conducting a raid . . . .”275 Moreover, 
a New York immigration judge considered the 1998 MOU in a case involving an 
employer who called the federal immigration authorities in response to  
employee FLSA and NLRA complaints.276 The judge suppressed evidence  
gathered from the raid because federal immigration authorities had ignored the 
MOU.277  
 
272. The DOL is not the only agency involved. In the Title VII context, federal immi-
gration authorities and the EEOC have worked together to weigh conflicting  
interests. See, e.g., Garcia, supra note 140, at 762 (referring to a “joint enforcement 
action” between federal immigration authorities, the EEOC and the Department 
of Justice and stating that “[a]lthough separate federal bureaucracies manage  
immigration and labor law, there is precedent for the kind of joint enforcement 
action that would bring together these two agencies and their dichotomous bodies 
of law”); see also Saucedo, supra note 140, at 952-53 (referring to the DOL and the 
EEOC as two federal employment agencies that could help victims of workplace 
law abuses to gain protection from immigration law’s U visa). 
273. See, e.g., Decker, supra note 140, at 2194 & n.5 (citing various examples of such 
compliance and commenting that “the agencies implementing [workplace protec-
tion and immigration] goals have found much common ground”). 
274. Robert I. Correales, Did Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., Produce Disposable 
Workers?, 14 Berkeley La Raza L.J. 103, 142 n.287 (2003). 
275. Nat’l Immigration Law Ctr., Issue Brief: Immigration Enforcement Dur-
ing Labor Disputes 2 (2009), available at http://www.nilc.org/dc_conf/ 
flashdrive09/Worker-Rights/emp20_labordispute-infobrief-2009-11-06.pdf. Scho-
lars have noted the need for these agencies to work together more closely. See, e.g., 
Nessel, supra note 228, at 384 (arguing that federal immigration agents should use 
their discretion even more to avoid interfering with workplace law regulation); 
Saucedo, supra note 140, at 952-53 (demonstrating that immigration law’s U visa 
has been used and could be used more to protect “immigrant workers who suffer 
workplace abuses, whether or not those abuses result in criminal prosecutions”). 
276. See In re Herrera-Priego, Decision and Order of the Immigration Judge 22-24  
(July 10, 2003), available at http://www.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/IWR_Material/ 
Advocate/Herrera-Priego.pdf. 
277. Id.; see Lee, supra note 232, at 1144 (“Herrera-Priego hints at what kind of reform 
might be possible by sending the right set of signals to employers. Instead of  
permitting employers to hire unauthorized immigrants with the expectation that 
they can always report those immigrants should the immigrants attempt to vindi-
cate their workplace rights, the principles embodied by Herrera-Priego foreclose 
reporting as an escape hatch. This puts employers to a choice: either they screen 
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MOUs, however, are not likely to end federal immigration enforcement 
during labor disputes entirely. The instructions are intended to provide  
guidance and do not carry with them the force of law.278 In the end, federal  
immigration agents can and sometimes do engage in enforcement of immigra-
tion law during a labor dispute.279 Indeed, there are a series of examples of  
federal immigration enforcement during labor disputes despite the 1998 
MOU.280 One scholar characterized the 1998 MOU’s effect as leading to “the oc-
casional willingness of immigration authorities to avoid entanglement in labor 
disputes”281 and showed that a “substantial amount of [federal immigration] 
worksite enforcement correlates with the existence of [a] formal labor  
dispute[], despite internal agency rules intended to limit [federal immigration 
authorities’] involvement in employer-employee struggles.”282 Despite their lack 
of teeth and inconsistent enforcement,283 the MOUs show that federal agencies 
consider federal employment policies as part of immigration enforcement. 
In sum, subfederal employer-sanctions laws may conflict with IRCA  
because they conflict with IRCA’s integration of federal employment policy 
concerns. In particular, these subfederal laws are in conflict with IRCA’s incor-
poration of Title VII’s employment policy goal to protect against national-
 
for unauthorized immigrants in good faith when making hiring choices, or they 
knowingly hire unauthorized immigrants and face all of the limitations imposed 
by labor and employment law.”). Similarly, after a federal immigration raid of a 
hotel during an ongoing labor dispute, federal authorities allowed the workers to 
remain in the United States for the duration of the dispute. See Kimberly Hayes 
Taylor, Illegal Workers Get To Stay in U.S., Minneapolis Star Trib., Apr. 26, 
2000, at 1B. But cf. Montero v. INS, 124 F.3d 381, 385 n.4 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The 
[MOU] in no way suggests that the INS believes that undocumented aliens should 
be shielded from deportation simply because they are engaged in a labor  
dispute.”). 
278. See Kim, supra note 15, at 272-73 (“[I]mplementation of the MOU is discretionary 
and does not prohibit immigration enforcement in cases where there are labor 
disputes in progress.”); Nessel, supra note 228, at 385 (stating that the MOU “fails 
because it contains no enforcement mechanism”). 
279. See Kim, supra note 15, at 272-73; Nessel, supra note 228, at 385-86. Because  
enforcement requires “voluntary worker complaints . . . the refusal of the INS to 
significantly restrict its involvement in labor disputes results in the de facto exclu-
sion of undocumented workers from the protection of federal and state labor 
laws.” Wishnie, supra note 140, at 518. 
280. See, e.g., Velequez-Tabir v. INS, 127 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 1997). 
281. See Wishnie, supra note 140, at 521. 
282. Michael J. Wishnie, The Border Crossed Us: Current Issues in Immigrant Labor, 28 
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 389, 390 (2004). 
283. See, e.g., Smith & Ruckelshaus, supra note 267, at 592 (referring to “studies of the 
policy [that] show that [the MOU] has not been uniformly enforced”). 
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origin discrimination and FLSA’s goal to ensure that workers get “a fair day’s 
pay for a fair day’s work.”284  
 
V. Federal Actors as Immployment-Law Mediators 
 
Some may ask whether subfederal employer-sanctions laws would be viable 
if state and local governments were to amend their laws such that they mimic 
IRCA entirely. Undoubtedly, such changes would go a long way in ameliorating 
the conflicts between federal employment law and workplace-based immigra-
tion enforcement, covered in Parts III and IV.285 Nonetheless, here this Article 
proposes arguments for why, even if these subfederal laws were amended to 
copy all aspects of the federal employer-sanctions law (including its antidiscri-
mination protections, complaint procedures, and appropriations to the DOL), 
subfederal employer-sanctions laws should still be voided.  
It is possible that these subfederal laws are also in conflict with congres-
sional intent to exclude subfederal governments from the role of mediating  
tensions between workplace-based immigration enforcement and federal  
employment policy goals. As Part IV illustrated, Congress placed federal actors 
in the role of mediating between immigration policy goals and employment 
policy goals in a number of ways. Because subfederal actors make the enforce-
ment decisions pursuant to subfederal employer-sanctions laws, they are  
undoubtedly in the role of mediating (or ignoring) any potential tensions  
between immigration enforcement and the federal workplace rights of em-
ployees. Future scholarship should consider Congress’s intent in this regard. 
Nonetheless, even if Congress did not intend to preempt subfederal govern-
ments from this mediating role, there is an important policy reason to keep 
subfederal governments from mediating conflicts between immigration law and 
employment law. 
Simply stated, only federal actors can adequately negotiate ongoing ten-
sions between workplace-based immigration enforcement and federal employ-
ment law policy goals. State and local authorities cannot consistently replicate 
how the federal government would resolve every potential conflict between 
workplace immigration enforcement and the enforcement of federal employ-
ment policies.286 Professor Hiroshi Motomura’s persuasive argument that fed-
eral immigration law enforcement is contingent and discretionary supports this 
 
284. A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
285. For an argument that local laws that “track” federal immigration law require-
ments should not be preempted, see Schuck, supra note 79, at 80. 
286. In other contexts, the federal government balances its immigration regulatory  
interests with other federal interests. For instance, the federal government often 
considers national security and foreign policy more generally when it regulates 
immigration. See Wishnie, supra note 77, at 528. 
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point.287 Federal immigration authorities, according to Motomura, consider a 
wide and varying array of factors in their enforcement decisions.288 State and 
local governments cannot adequately reproduce this contingent and discretio-
nary process of deciding whether, when, and how to enforce immigration at the 
workplace.  
Subfederal governments are often responding to a different set of circums-
tances and therefore would not consistently come to the same conclusions as 
the federal government. As Motomura asserts, “It is crucial not only who picks 
enforcement targets, but also who allocates resources, and who balances  
enforcement against competing concerns like inappropriate reliance on race or 
ethnicity.”289 From a policy standpoint, the federal government is simply in the 
best position to weigh the sometimes-competing interests of federal employ-
ment laws, which promote uniform and broad enforcement nationally to avoid 
the creation of subclasses of workers, and immigration regulation in the 
workplace.290  
 
Conclusion 
 
The rise of immployment law since the federal government brought immi-
gration enforcement into the workplace in 1986 poses a serious Supremacy 
Clause question about whether federal employment laws (namely FLSA and 
Title VII) impliedly preempt subfederal employer-sanctions laws. This Article’s 
new implied-preemption framework addresses this previously overlooked ques-
tion. It establishes that four subfederal workplace-based immigration laws, and 
those that are like them, are unconstitutional because they conflict with funda-
mental federal employment policy goals to protect employees from employ-
ment discrimination and to encourage valid employee-initiated complaints for 
the benefit of employees more broadly. Thus, if one is in doubt about whether 
federal immigration law preempts subfederal employer-sanctions laws, consid-
eration of federal workplace law’s preemptive effects clarifies that federal law 
does, indeed, preempt these laws. 
In addition, this Article further elaborates why we should consider the joint 
preemptive effect of the two federal statutory regimes that subfederal employer-
 
287. See Motomura, supra note 47, at 2060-65. 
288. See id. 
289. Id. at 2064 (emphases added). 
290. Even though immigration enforcement and employment enforcement overlap, 
they do not always compete with each other. For an argument that workplace-law 
enforcement helps the federal government’s immigration policy goals, see Lenni 
B. Benson, The Invisible Worker, 27 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 483, 495 (2002), 
contending that “increase[d] wage and hour and safety and health enforcement to 
ensure the safety of all workers” will deter employer use of undocumented work-
ers and adding that workers who participate in these enforcement efforts need to 
be assured that they “will not be turned over to the INS” as a result. 
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sanctions laws implicate: federal immigration law and federal employment law. 
This hybrid immployment-law preemption framework shows that subfederal 
employer-sanctions laws may conflict with Congress’s intent to promote federal 
employment policy as part of IRCA. In other words, they conflict with IRCA’s 
employment policies. It thereby adds weight to the arguments in favor of 
preemption of subfederal immigration regulation in the workplace. Finally, this 
Article proposes an additional rationale for voiding subfederal laws, which  
applies regardless of whether they mirror IRCA’s language. Subfederal actors 
are simply not in a position to adequately mediate potential tensions between 
immigration-law priorities and federal employment-law priorities.  
This Article brings fundamental federal employment policy goals out of the 
shadows and into constitutional analyses of subfederal employer-sanctions 
laws. It demonstrates that scholars, courts, states, and municipalities debating 
the constitutionality of subfederal employer-sanctions laws should not just con-
sider federal immigration law; they should also consider federal employment 
policy goals.291 While this Article’s primary focus is on preemption analyses, it 
has policy implications as well. The tensions between workplace-based immi-
gration regulation and federal workplace protections for employees, exposed 
here, deserve policymakers’ attention as they contemplate so-called comprehen-
sive immigration reform.292 
 
291. It is beyond the scope of this Article, but the conflict between subfederal employ-
er-sanctions laws and federal employment law’s promotion of employee-initiated 
complaints may violate the First Amendment of the Constitution. The First 
Amendment’s Petition Clause states that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridg-
ing . . . the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.” U.S. Const. amend. I. Professor Michael Wishnie has persuasively 
argued that “law enforcement policies that deter noncitizens from reporting” 
FLSA and Title VII violations may violate the First Amendment right to petition 
the government. Wishnie, supra note 229, at 213 n.105. He contends that IRCA’s 
enforcement scheme is constitutionally suspect because it deters potential plain-
tiffs from reporting workplace-law violations. Id. at 213. As Section III.B of this 
Article illustrates, Congress has clearly set up an intricate reporting scheme with 
FLSA and Title VII. State and local efforts to expand the employer-sanctions  
regime and workplace-based immigration enforcement threaten to block these 
channels of communication further. These subfederal laws are especially suspect 
in light of the First Amendment’s Petition Clause because they do not even have 
the same inter-agency coordination or minimal safeguards (such as employment-
discrimination protections and DOL appropriations) as IRCA. 
292. See Ruben Navarrette, Jr., Why America Needs More Guest Workers, San Diego 
Union-Trib., Dec. 21, 2008, at F-3 (“Comprehensive immigration reform is a 
three-legged stool: enhanced border enforcement; earned legalization for the un-
documented; and guest workers for U.S. employers to fill jobs that Americans 
won’t do.”). 
